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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces
Agreement is a multilateral treaty entered into by the United
States and most of the other nations of that organization. It-
purpose is to resolve the multitude of legal and jurisdictional
problems which resulted from the stationing of troops of one or
mere NATO nations in other NATO countries. In testifying in
support of the treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Secretary of Defense Wilson declared, "It became appar -t
early in the creation of the North xVblantic Treaty Organisation
that these (legal and jurisdictional) problems might best be
solved on a multilateral basis." (Here tho secretary spoke of the
many technical legal problems resulting from the stationing of
troops of one country in another country. ) Cfcnoral Bradley,
U.S. Army, declared before the same committee that the advantages
of the Status of Forces Agreement to the United Stabes, as a
member of NATO, are twofold. ''---- First it enables tho
Commander of a United States military force to engage in peace-
time ilaTO operations in NATO countries without undue hindrance
from the authorities of those countries. Second, it confers
upon individual members of the United States forces stationed . 1
NATO countries certain rights which are essential to their
"Hearing s Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Unite -.
St atus on Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Arpie
d
Forces and Ililitary Headquarters,' c"3d Gong, 1st Sc s s
.
, p . i [1 95Tj
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morale and well-beinr;. "*"
The treaty i-:as, initially drafted by the Department of Defj
in 1950* Negotiations were entered into among all members of
ITATO the following year. It was simed by rcpi esentstives of I
such nations in London England on 19 June 1951 1 Hearings on t|
treaty were conducted before the United States Sonate Poroirn
Relations Committee on 17-18 Apr"' 1 ] S:?3. Shortly thereafter it
was reported to the Senate. On Z)\ June 1953 ~-t ".-/as referred
back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for supplemental
hearings in order to consider certain objections raised by .a
roun of Senators led by Senator Brisker of Ohio. Eventually 3
was reported back to the Senate where it i ras approved, by a sub-
stantial majority thereof. 3 However, as a condition to ratifi-
cation the Senate incorporated into the treaty certain reserva-
tions. In due course the treaty, including those reservations]
wos signed by the President
.
These reservations nose certain rroblens to the cognizant
commanding officer of United States military forces stationed '.
the various NATO nations. It n s clear that he is charyed with
the. duty of determining, where ar.orooriato, the extort of leya]
safe yuards afforded by the criminal 1 aws of the particular stat
in which his troops arc stationed, that where he determines th
those safojruards do not moasu.ro up to A"-orlean standards lie is
2ibid




to request certain relief fron the authorities o^ the receiviii
state, and that whore such relief is net granted he is to seek
the assistance of the United States State Department . However,
the reservation does not define any clear standards by which such
cov ':.vh;--\- officer is to be guided. It merely declares that the
comri.andinr; officer shall insure-, to the extent and in the "is.Tier
specified, that members of his com iar.d shall be accorded t^osc
"constitutional riyhts (they) would enjoy in the United States.' 1 '
The primary purpose of this study is to esccrtain and clarify
these considerations with which the cognizant United States
Commanding Officer should concern himself in imp lonertin; the
Status of Forces A:;re orient as modified by the Senate Resolution.
In furtherance of this purpose an appraisal of the Senatorial
intent implicit in the Resolution will be eadc. Nocessarily
bearing upon this Senatorial intent arc the extent of the
Constitutional ri.,hts sorvicomon would bo entitled to in the
United States when tried for criminal offenses and the extent of
any equivalent Drotcctlon afforded by the criminal orooodures o ""
i
NATO nations, and by the provisions of the Status of Forces
A; i ' e e nont itself.
Chapter II of this studj constitutes a survey of those
minimum rif.hts and safeguards accorded by the Fedora] Constitution
'to accused persons tried by criminal courts in the United States,
Chapter III encompasses a study of the rirhts and safeguards
'i-Soe Apeendix A
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croated by the Status of Forcer. Agreement and. Chapter V appraa
the Senatorial intent of its Resolution o^ l£ July 195.3.
CHAPTER II A DETERMINATION OP THE NATURE AND SCOPE OP
'"'CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS A SERVICEMAN WOULD ENJOY
IN THE UNITED STATES" AS CONTEMPLATED IN PARA-
GRAPH 3 OF THE RESOLUTION
Constitutional Guarantees Within fcho Moaning of
tho Resolution
American servicemen who commit offenses within the United
States nay, depending upon the circumstances of the case, subject
themselves to throe different jurisdiet ions : state, federal c
military. Experience shows that few servicemen are triod by
Federal Courts, Tho groat majority ef criminal trials, other
than courts martial, of sorvicomen in the United States arc con-
ducted in state criminal courts. Those rights end safeguards
guaranteed defendants tried in Fedora] courts are, therefore,
oT much loss significance and importance than these accorded
defendants in state courts. For the purposes of this stud}/ the
former may quite safely be ignored.
Par,&£rapli 3 of the Resolution of Ratification, with Reserva-
tions, as arroc.c' to by the Senate on l£ July 195>3 provides as
follows; "If, in the opinion of (the Commanding Officer of the
armed force of the United Statos in tho receiving state), under
all the circumstances of the case, there is danger that the
accused will not 'be protected because of the absence or denia]
of constitutional rights ho would enjoy in the United States, t o
commanding officer shall request the authorities of the rccoiv: i
;
state to waive jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 3 (s) ef Article VII (which requires the receiving
state to yivc 'sympathetic coin id oration ' to such roaucst) and
such authorities refuse to waive jurisdiction, the commanding
officer shall request through diplomatic channels and notifica-
tion shall be yivon. to the Executive Branch to the Armed Sorvic
Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. "^ The
Resolution, therefore, docs not expressly specify those Overti:- •
lar kinds of Constitutional guarantees co ntoir.platod by the Sen;
However, the Resolution dees direct the State Department to md.
a formal nrotost to the foreign government through diplomatic
channels in the event that any serviceman is deemed to have be;
denied the equivalent of such rights by a foreign tribunal. It
would anpear that any such protest, to be tenable, would no cess
ily have to show that the rights, allcsQ&ly denied the scrvicc-
"an in a foreign tribunal, would, have be in accorded him had hu
been tried for the s;en offense by a state criminal court any-
whore in the United States « To argue that he would have itcca
more rights had. ho been taxed in a Federal court ignores the
fact that he likely would never have been tried in such court
bad the same offense bee 1 committed by him in the United States
Again, to argue that he would have received moru riahts h .d h.
been tried in a state court of the state of his domicile is to
disrogard the facts of military life, since servicemen ard
rarely stationed in their homo states. Thus, a Nov; Yorker may
well find himself serving his term of duty in Ca?t.ifomia or in.
1 See Appendix A.
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Mississippi. An assertion that the serviceman would receive
mrc rights if tried by a United States military court martial
appears at first sifh-t to be riorr; ocrsuasivo. However, any
particular offense committed by a serviceman in a NATO nation
would as lilcoly bo tried before such* court martial as if com-
mitted in the United States.
Two cogent reasons o.T'rist, therefore, Tor predicating the
determination of the nature and scone of "Constitutional right;
a serviceman would on/joy in the UYu.tcd States" upon those mini'
rum ri-hts which he would on,ioy if tried for a criminal offens
ir a state count: (a) the much greater importance, in point o:
frequency of occurrence, of trials by state courts, anc! (b) t.1
necessity for basing any State Department protest upon a con-
vine iu^ showing that the accused ;rou?,d have inevitably receive 1
mere rights had he been tried for the same offense in a non-
military court anywhere in the United States,
Those minimum rights which a state court must accord de-
fendants who are tried in their criminal courts are governed b;
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. It will bo annropriate, therefore, to
briefly o:;aminc the general construction olaccd upon the due
process clause by sur Federal courts insofar as it annlios to
such proceedings
.
General Construal of the Due Process Clause
A lone line of Federal decisions has interpreted the due
-/-
process clause of the* Fourteenth Amendment as affording; ccrta
r.i btr. and safeguards to persons tried by state courts for
criminal offenses. These rights and safeguards arc not coc--
tcnslvc with those afforded persons tried for cr.1ni.Lru?.! offcrJ
by Federal courts. !,The Pourtoenth Amendment does not say tJ
no State shall deprive any person of liberty without follow!'.
the Federal Process of n aw as prcsc.r5.be d ^or the Federal court
in comparable Federal ca3cs« It says merely, 'nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due Process of law 1 . This duo process is not equivalent for
the process of Federal courts or for the process of any par-
ticular state. It has reference, rather, to a standard of
process that 'nay cover many varieties of processes that arc
repressive cf differing combinations of historical or modern]
local or other juridical standards, orov5.dod they do not conl
flict with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the br.se of oar civil and political institution m
In '."Jo 1 :!: v CJolorado3 the court said, "The not 5 on that thl
'due process of law 1 guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment i-
shorthand for the first j.ipht amendments and thereby incor-
porates thorn has boon rejected PTr this court apair end aaair
after impressive consideration. The issue is closed.
"
Those rights and safeguards guaranteed by the Fourteenth
-Bute v Illinois, 333 U.S. 6)-Q (19'"3)
Brady ." 3T0" U.S ." IfpT ft %2
)
.
3338 U.S. ?S (19k9).
Soo also Ectts v
Amendment arc those which arc essential to a free society but
no more than that. The broad tost, repeatedly employed by the
United States Suoromc Court, la determining the extent of those
rights and safeguards is that state criminal proceedings, taken
as a whole, must not offend common and fundamental ideas of fair-
ness and right,'*- "Due process of law" under the Fourteenth
Amendment is satisfied, if the criminal procedures, afforded the
defendant by state criminal courts, conform to standards deemed
reasonable and rirhfc»5 Even thou/.h a decision of a state com .
upon a question of leer 1 , law is wrong it is not an infraction
the Pourtoonth Amendment merely because it is wrong. o Nor doc
the Federal Constitution impose any impediment to the correction
er modification by a state court of erroneous or older con-
structions of local law embraced in previous decisions.* How-
ever, "due process of law - - - - conveys neither formal nor
fixed nor narrow requirements. - - - - Basic rights do not be-
come petrified as of any one time, oven though as a matter of
human experience, sore- ea rot rhetorically be called eternal
verities. ----- Representing ae it does a living principle duo
process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may
-pBctts v 3rach£, note P supra.
5Tn Ealkq v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1 937) the court sa
"Certain rights set forth "in the Federal Constitution may hav
value and importance. Even so, they rmo not of the very esse..
of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to
violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
con.caT.oncc of our poonlo e.r. to be ranked as fundamental."
QStockholders v Sterling, 30 Q U.S. 17£ (1937).
7Wolf* v Colorado, note 3 supra
.
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at a given time be doomed the limits of the essentials of fun-
damental rights. To rely on a tidy formula for the easy deter-
mination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal
enforcement nay satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the
movements of a free society. ;r" From the foregoing it is clear
that specific Federal decisions, rather than general formulae
J
must be resorted to in determining whether the due orocess clav
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated in any particula
For convenience, the various Fodcral decisions relating tc
the due orocoss clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ere heroin
considered fro \ the standpoint of three broad gcncra.l category
(a) those rights and safeguards which it insures to an accused
prior to trial, (b) those rights and safeguards which it insuB
to an accused during trial, anc^ (c) those rights and safeguard
it insures to n e. accused subsequent to trial.
Rights of an Accused Accorded by Duo Process
Prior to Trial
The Federal courts have ruled unon a numbeir of situs,t ions j
n in °\ <-i T ri rv v-> -p " n , y-. 4- r\ +-> i .-^ "| no n^qin-i Vil t < . f f - . » i •? v-, r~ ",-\ <-> q -j r> v> -" <— V- h o n.f
* J. •-'«••; , J J. - - *.' >. \* v I O _•. -i . ^-. § •_ s • •*-/<» .i. - _i. t t-w '• *-* *-* W — • - lJt.»J r.. w J. ,j_ v • W • .^ -. i.
accused persons. Ho doubt others will cone before those court
from time to time in the future. To date si-: general catogcri
of such possible rights have reached the Federal courts for
G Ibid.
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decision. They arc commented upon herewith*
Intelligibility of State Penal Statutos
The terras of a state penal statute, which creates a new
offense, nust be sufficiently clear and explicit so as to un-
couivocally inforra those who are subject to it of the kind of
conduct on thoir nart which will render them liable to its
penalties," A statute which cither forbids or requires the doi?
of an aet in terms so vague that ir.n of ccinrnon intelligence must
necessarily guess at its mcaninc and differ as to its aoolicaticn
violates the first ussontials o"p clue, process. ^ The statute which
was the subject of tho decision in the Lanzotta case roads as
follows : "Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known
to be a n.e.rabor of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who
has boon convicted at least three tires of being a disorderly
person, or who baa been convicted of any crire in this or any
of or state, is declared to be a gangster. !l Tho court held that
the conduct which tho statute purported to denounce waa so vague,
uncertain and indefinite as to bj repugnant to due process.
A statute ray he vague and uncertain and yet rendered valid
provided that the indietnont, based upon such statute, sufficicr 1 ;;
apprises tho accused of the offense intended to b. charged. Tin:
,
9Lanzptta v Now Jersey, 306 U.S. lj.£l (1?39).
10 In Connally v General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1925)
the court hold that tho test to bo applied in determining this
issue is whether the statute establishes a standard well enough
known to enable those within (its) reach to correctly apply it*
-11-
1]in United States v Franz the United States Court of iLilitar;.
Appeals held that Article 1 3lj. of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice did not violate any Constitutional proscriptions whore
the specification, based upon that article, spelled out the
alleged offense in sufficient detail for the accused to he able
bo intelligently prepare his defense. Irs that case, however,
the court Dointed out that the provisions embodied in Article 1
of the Code had been part of our military law sinco 1773', and
that therefore the general kinds of conduct 'eroscribed by that
article were well known to American military law. On the other
hand, the court declared in the Lanzetta case-'— that on the fac
therein the specification of the details of the offenses intend
to bo charged in the indictment did not cure the statute of its
ronugnancy to due process where the statute is va^uc and unceit
The two decisions do not appear bo be contradictory ,for in the
Lanzetta case usage had not determined the meaning of the vjordj
"gangster,
"
In determining whether a particular statute violates due
process, therefore, consideration must bo given to the indie tine:
WBxro the latter spells out the alleged offense in sufficient
detail it may operate to remove the statute's Constitutional
repugnancy provided that usage and custom have served to make
reasonably certain the kinds of conduct contemplated by the
statute.
U
2 USCMA 16 1 (1952).
''- no t e 9 > zvt)r a
.
-12-
Right 'to Certainty of Charges
Irrespective of the certainty of the statutory language
upon which it is based, an indictment must be spelled out in
such precise and unambiguous terns as to enable the defendant
to understand the offense intended to be charged, and to enable
him. to prepare his defense. In Cole v Arkansas -* the defendant
was charged with a violation of a particular statute which
consisted of two sections. The indictment failed to spc"1 ! out
in sufficient detail that particular section allegedly violated,
The court held that, in effect, the accused was convicted of an
offense with which he was never charged and that this procedure
violated the d.v.c pro cos._ clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
much as though the accused had been convicted upon a charge that
was never made. The court in In re Oliver- 1-*-!- declared that, as a
minimum, due process requires that an accused be given reason 1 a
notice of the nature of the charge against him.
In addition, the time intervening between the service of
the indictment and the arraignment of the accused must be
sufficient to permit an intelligent nlca and any appropriate
motion pertaining to the indictment. Finally, an accused who
doer, not understand English is entitled to a translation of a
^333 U.S. 196 (19.''8).
,•'1333 u.s. 257 (19I1.8).
'•->Soo also In_.ro_ Hurchisorm 3i|9 U.S. 133 (19^!-) where the
court took an identical position on similar facts.
-^Orfiold, Criminal Pro 00dure s_ from Arrest to Appeal , p. -p 77.
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copy of the indictment or information, '
Rir^t to Counsel
The issue concerning the Constitutional rights of a
defendant to counsel, cither before or during trial or both,
has boon litigated be for'- the Supreme Court more then any other
single issue involving the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is clear that no absolute right to counsel exist
Each case must be examined on its merits in determining the
issue. Some of the important factors which have been considcrc
pertinent thereto are : the seriousness of the offense charged,
the aac, experience and mentality of the defendant, the com-
plexity of the issues involved in the trial, whether the defend
had expressly requested the assistance of counsel, whether the
nature of the charge had been explained to the defendant and.
whether the defendant was financially able to employ his own
i P
counsel. In Uve as v Pennsylvania"*" the defendant was tried f:
a felony, convicted and sentenced to forty years' impris earner t,
He was younn; and inexperienced. Ho was not advised of his rv;-'
to counsel and no attempt was made to explain to him the effect
of his plea of pjuilty. The court held that he was denied due
process. In Powoll v Alabama-*- 9 the court hold that in a capitc!
case, whore the defendant is unable financially to employ counsc
17 -
**Io-xl-LCm^; ot .1 v Coleman, 5 Pod Sup 702 (1931th
^335" O". irff "(i'9l|.0T.
1 9.287 U.S. h£ (1932).
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and is incapable of conducting his own defense because of ig-
norance, illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether or not a request is made, to assirn counsel as a requisite
of due process. The court in that case further hold that such
duty would not be discharged by an assignment cf counsel at such
tine and under such circumstances as to Preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation of the case. In Wade v Mayo r-
tho court held that whore a person charged with crime is by
reason of a r:;.j, ignorance or incapacity unable to properly dofe
himself the refusal of a state court to appoint counsel at his
request is a denial of due procoss even in the prosecution of a
case of a relatively simple ncturc. In Hawk v Olson^l the
accused was denied counsel during the critical period of his
arraignment and the impaneling of the jury. The court held that
such denial violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.,
In Molanson v 0'Bricn^3 the accused, who was tried for rape and
who had ample financial moans, was denied the ri.qht to employ
his own counsel . It was held that under those circumstancos the
defendant had a Constitution..! riftht to counsel and further to
bo afforded the services of such counsel in ample time tc insure
an adequate investigation into the facts of the case, obtain wit-
nesses and prepare a defense.
20-
•326' U.S. 271 litffe)'.
^33!) u.s. 672 (1*8)
oo~
--See also Sraith v 0' Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (19M).
2
^191 Fed 2d 963".
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On the other hand, the court in Eotts v Brady--^- held tbat
indigent farm laborer, convicted of robbery by a court sittini




. was refused. The court therein said, ''We cannot say
that the (Fourteenth) Amcndm ont ombodics on inexorable comraonl
bh b no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly
co iductcd end justice accorded a defendant who is not roprcsoiH
by counsel." B'our justices dissented, assorting; that the tcr»
of the Sixth Amendment are incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Similarly, in Bute v Illinois^ the court held t'nit
the defendant in that case bod nob been denied duo process.
There the defendant bad boon tried i'cr allegedly taking indecent
liberties with on eight year old child. At his trial ho failJ
to request the assistance of counsel or to declare that ho war
financially unable to do so. lie also pleaded guilty as chary.,' 1
The court bold that the trial court was not bound to initiate
inn.uirios oo to bh,. defendant's possible desires for counsel on
that he was not entitled to the assistance of counsel on the
facts y£ the case in the absun.ee of a specific request, By way
of dictiiii the court further declared that had the case been
capital, the trial court would have boon bound to inouire into
the defendant's possible desire for counsel and that in the
event bhat such assistance would be desired and the defendant
ohncto d t supra
,
'--hoc to 2, supra.
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would bo unab-lc t pay therefor, to assign coimscl for him. °
An accused's right to ccunool may, under certain circum-
stances, accrue ovon prior to the prcforra} s-f chargos. Thus,
in Filcos v Alabaraa27 the dofoxidant, an Ignorant negro who was
suspected of an attempted rape, was hold in solitary confinement
for one woo!:, during which time he was questioned intermittently
by police officials. Among the reasons assigned by the court in
holding that the defendant hod boon denied clue process was the
fact that a volunteer counsel was denied access to the defence i.t
while in confinement.
Right to a Grand Jury
In a number of decisions the United States Supreme Court
I
lias held that the Fourteenth Ararmdrront due -process clause docs
not guarantee a defondanb the right to o.n indictment by a grand
,'ur:r /° Procoodings by information, as a substitute therefor,
constitute due process even in connection with -prosocut iens for
felonies, 2C>
Dnublu Jeopardy
Strictly speaking, tlio subject of double jeopardy dooc not
properly belong in the category of possible Constitutional rights
of
c
'°Sec Reo-pr, Civil _Riahts_ in the_ United States., pi). ^Z3-2 '.
and Wood, Dips Prcccss~_o.f Lawf"rj-j/ 217-"2l6r<
zpS K.v/rT:09oTl95T).
^Hurtado v California, 110 U.S. $lo (l88it): Harwell v Dow ,
176 U.S. £Ul "TlV0b)":'".7'ord:^' v Ilassachusotts., ?? l> U.S. To7 (191.1)
29ib'id.
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which an accused may possess prior to trial. However, any sue..
rirdats as he nay possess by virtue of double jeopardy r.iust bo
asserted by him prior to his plea. Convenience, if not lo:;i> I
therefore dictates the advisability of its consideration in tfl
particular portion of the present chapter,
Palhc v Connecticut-* is the leading: case on the subject l
the rights of an accused, tried by a state court, to assert tl
plea of double jeopardy in bar of trial, Here the court, for J.
first time in its history, intimated that a situation could cm
where double jeopardy mlyht violate due process. Prior to the
Fall:c case the Supreme Court had ruled upon this question on
several occasions, but had consistently hold in each case that
due process had not been violated and steadfastly refused to
consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment embraces any guaronw
against double jeopardy. Thus, in Murphy v Massachusetts 33- the
court held that where the original conviction of the prisoner I
en appeal, construed by the state appellate court to be IcayalJ
defective and therefore a nullity, a subsequent trial, convict-
and sentence of the accused d yrivecl. him of no Constitutional
rights, Ayain, in Drover v Illinois32 the court held that a
retrial of an accused, after a hurv ^'ura does not subject hia
to double jeopardy within the meaning of the Fourteenth Anorda
•i note 5, supra.
ehi77 u.s. i5^~(i9oo).
3fl87 u.s. 71 (1902).




20?" U.S. 188 (1907),
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In the Palko case the state statute in issue authorized tJ .
prosecution to appeal any question of law (as opposed to qucsti na
of fact) arising out of a criminal prosecution. Pursuant thereto
tli-
-
: state did appeal a conviction of second decree murder and
sentence to life imprisonment of the defendant, who .'.ad been
charged with first degree murder. After obtaining a reversal i c
state prosecuted the defendant a second time for first decree
murder. He was thereupon found guilty as charged and sentenced
to death. The court hold that the statute did not subject the
oofondant to double jeopardy "so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it" and that n ib (did not) violate those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions."
State statutes which provide for more severe punishment for
repeat offenders are net repugnant to due process. In Graham v
West Virrinia^- til0 CCUi,t hcld tiiat ruch offenders wcrc "not
boir.fr punished ------ a socond time for the earlier offons . ,
but (that) the ropctition of criminal conduct a^ravatcs their
nuilt end justifies heavier penalties when they are again con-
victed."
There remains for consideration an;; right of the state to
appeal a conviction based upon orrors of fact in the trial court.
Such appeals, hosed solely and manifestly upon the mere chance
that a second "jury uifht come to conclusions o.rc favorable to
>v2?k U.S. 6 16 (191.1).
-IS-
tho proa o cutIon would appear to be contrary to the ingrained
American sense of justice. On tho other hand, whore the jury :
tho first trial acquits a defendant in tho faco of such strong
evidence of guilt that reasonable persons would conclude the
contrary there appears to be no good reason why a retrial would
not bo consistent with duo orocoss,
Sx Post Facto Laws
Ex post facto laws are prohibited by section 10, Article 1
of tho Fodcral Constitution rather than by tho duo process clau
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The principle that a penal statufc
may not apply to conduct committed prior to its enactment is
closely related to the rules concerning the prcciseness of
language essential to penal statutes and indictments.
The prohibition against or. post facto laws is directed
against legislative action only and not against erroneous and
incons istcnt decisions by state courts, J> A statute is ex post
facto and hence unconstitutional under a number of circumstance.
Thus, conduct engaged in by a person prior to the enactment of :
statute may not be made criminal thereby,
-
;u Punishment may not
bo increased by statute in order to apply to criminal acts
37com i.it tod prior to the enactment thereof. Rules of evidenco
^Frank v Hangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
^IbidV
3'Lindsoy_ v Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
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may not tao changed in order to permit convictions based upon
evidonce which is loss than or materially different from that
required at the time the offense was committed if such change
curtails the substantial rights of the accused. ^ On the other
hand, modes of procedure in criminal trials may be changed,
without violating duo -orccess, provided that the accused's sub-
stantial rights are not thereby adversely affected. Thus, a
statute, which changes the olace of trial from one county to
another, Is not ex post facto. 3" Furthermore, statutes which
I c
increase the number of appellate judges, ''• or which grant the
right of appeal to a state, ^~ or change the method of selection
of the jurors, '-^ or permit a comparison of handwriting exports"..'
have boon hold not to be ex post facto.
State statutes, which provide for increased punishment for
new crimes thereafter committed by repeat offenders, arc not ex
post facto,''''
Rights of an Accused Accorded by Due Process During Trial
The duo process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
a fair trial to accused persons tried by state criminal courts.
*jzj2x parte Ilodley, I3.I4 .U.S. IsC (1090).
f 'Dune in "v T/iss our i, l£2 U.S. 377 (lG9 ! t. ).
',^'lbid.
^Ikillc;^ v North Carolina. 181 U.S. £89 (1901).
^Gibson v i'nss'issi^oi, 162 U.S. 56 1? (l3?6).
|!-3Tho::,ioson v llis'sourl,' 171 U.S. 380 (I898),
!
j !-0rygor' v Burke"," "?% U.S.. 7°3 (19l'8).
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A fair trial may bo said to have boon afforded an accused v-hom
the proceedings, taken as a whole, do not offend common and fi
amental ideas of justice and right. In essence, it is the rigl
to be hoard.^ The right to be hoard consists of various fact,
and attributes, the more important of which arc herewith disci
Trial by an Impartial Tribunal
Duo process requires a court to bo both impartial and
mentally competent to insure a fair and reasonably full hearing
on the merits. This attribute of impartiality is absent whorl
the court is unreasonably influenced by a mob. In Frank v I'lafl
the court declared that if the jury is intimidated by and tho
judge yields to . tho will of a mob so that there is an actual an
substantial interference with the course of justice there is a
departure from due process. Again, in Moore v Dompsov4' the
court said that if the whole proceedings is . a mask and all par 1
to the trial arc :,swcpt to a fatal and an irresistible wave of
public passion and - - - - if the state courts fail to correct
the wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for correction
nor tho possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no
other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob" is an
oxcus c for s uch procee ding s
,




The trial judge must have no substantial and direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the trial. Tumey v Chio^ involved a
situation where the trial judge was compensated for his services
only when he convicted the defendant. The court held that this
fact operated to deprive the defendant of due process. 3y way
of dictum, however, the court indicated that such practice would
not be condemned where the costs imposed were so small that they
could be ignored under the de minimus doctrine. In Dugan v Ohio^"
the court held that a conviction before a mayor's court did not
violate due process where the fixed salary of the mayor was paid
out of funds to which fines imposed by him contributed.
Since a tribunal must be substantially , free from any
pecuniary motives it follows that it must not be prejudiced for
any personal reasons such as enmity to the accused or to the
group or class to which he belongs.
Right to a Jury Trial
In ilissouri v Lewis and in Jo rdon v Ilassachusetts^l the
court held that jury trials are not essential to due process and
could be dispensed with altogether. However, where a jury is
authorized, duo process requires that it bo impartial,-3
Literally interpreted, Ilissouri v Lewis and Jordon v
[^273 U.S. 510 (1927).
4,9277 U.S. 61 (1928).
p^lOl U.S. 22 (1330).
^•note 28 supra.
^-PPlin. v WgiLJSPJgZi !75 U.S. 172 (1399).
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Massachusetts would permit a state tc try without a jury a pers
for such serious crimes as murder and rape. This would appear
to be a reasonable extension of the court's interpretation of I
process in view of the historic reason for the invention of the
jury system, The jury as we know it was devised to act as a
barrier between the citizens and capricious and intolerable edij
imposed by the sovereign. Jurors can and do protect a defendant
from such laws so long as they themselves are not in sympathy
with them. On the other hand, where the executive branch of the
government and the people of the land are in substantial agree
ment as to the justice of its laws the real need for the jury
disappears
,
Confrontation, Right to Cross-Examine Adverse
Witnesses
A defendant, in a state criminal trial, has no absolute
right to be confronted with adverse witnesses. The right exist,
only to the extent that a denial thereof would unreasonably
prejudice his cause. Thus, in Felts v Murphy"^ the court held
that due process was not denied a defendant who was totally dJ
and had not heard a word of testimony at his trial and the
evidence had not been read or otherwise made known to him. ilow-
ever, the defendant in that case did affirmatively authorize ful
discretion to his counsel in conducting the trial and made no
£3^01 U.S.-, 123 (1906).
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request to ascertain any details of the proceedings. On the
other hand, in In re Oliver-^ relief was granted the defendant,
who had been denied permission to be confronted with adverse
witnesses. There the judge conducted certain proceedings as a
one -man grand jury, during which he determined that a witness
(the defendant) gave evasive end false testimony solely upon the
basis of other previously given evidence. He thereupon summarily
found the witness to be in contempt of court and imposed a jail
sentence upon him. The court held that these high-handed
arocce dings violated due process. Among the re as ens given for
its decision was the total failure of the judge to accord the
accuse a the right to be confronted with adverse witnesses . ->^
The prosecution is permitted to employ depositions against
an accused provided, at least, that he was present at their
taking and the witness was permanently absent from the juris
-
diction. ^ Hearsay evidence is not banned by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Stein v Hew York-*' the court declared by way of
strong dictum that ''hearsay evidence, with all its subtleties,
anomalies and ranifications, ;I will not bo read into the
F Durteonth Amcndme nt
.
• Right to be Present at Trial
Generally speaking, an accused has a Constitutional right
^3note lii supra.
-e?3cc also In re iiurchison, note lp sup re




to be present at his trial, but minor deviations fror.i this rul
arc permit tod. For instance, an accused may properly be denied
his request to accompany the jury to the scone of the crime in
murder case.-' A trial judge, who permitted the questioning m
a juror in the absence of the accused and his counsel did not
violate duo process. .Tor does the due process clause requi
that an accused, convicted of murder, be permitted to cross-
examine probation officers as to his previous criminal record
when the trial judge considers such information in determining
whether to impose life imprisonment or the death sentence upon
him, A defendant is not entitled, as a matter of Constitu-
61tional right, to be present when the verdict is rendered. In
f o
summary, as was declared in Snyder v Massachusetts, "the
presence of a defendant (at various stages of his trial) is a
condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just
hearing would be thwarted by his absence and to that extent onl;
Rialit to Prompt, Speedy and Public .Trial
A fair trial presupposes that it is on en to the public. J
The scrutiny of the press and public insures against high-hancii
practices on the part of the tribunal. However, the right to c
public trial is not absolute. Thus, adolescents may be proper
£ Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (193i|).
59Howard' v Kentucky,' 200 U.b. 16b. (1906).
gOyilliaiafl v "few York, 33? U.S. Z\\\ (19U9).
?^Pr.aialc i n^iii, note 35 .supra.
j?fmoto 5>8 sujora,
°^In re Oliver, note llj. supra; In re Mirchison, note Vj, sir
"
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excluded therefrom vihorc their Presence would expose then to
immo.rality and depravity.
The Supreme Court has. never had occasion to rule upon the
question of whether a state court could conduct in camera pro-
ceedings during those portions of a criminal trial where evidence
pertaining to confidential natter, the disclosure of which would
endanger the security of the nation, is being considered. The
Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution expressly declares
that criminal trials in Federal courts shall be public, but the
Supremo court has repeatedly held that this amendment is not in-
corporatcd into the Fourteenth. '' In any particular case the
court would perhaps weigh the seriousness of the offense charged
against the risk to national security through a disclosure of the
evidence. If the offense were serious enough and the risk of
public disclosure of the evidence great enough the court might
hold that in camera proceedings as to that case would not be
repugnant to due pro c c s s
.
Finally, a trial should bo conducted with reasonable prompt-
ness and speed in view of all the circumstances, including the
status of ponding cases, but not so accelerated as to deny the
accused reasonable opportunity for trial preparation. 5
Right to Compulsory Process for the Attendance of Witnesses
The United States Supremo Court has never had occasion to





~Gpns tijffut ional Lfmi.t atdons (8th Ed, , 1 927. ) ., pp . 6k6
ShG and cases cited therein.
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decide squarely whether the due process clause of the Fourtcont.
Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to compulsory procos
for the attendance of witnesses. Dicta in In re Oliver, how
over, strongly suggests that such is the case. Of course, the
right is necessarily limited to those witnesses who are within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. As in other rights
involving duo process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it could
undoubtedly be asserted only where a denial thereof would be
inimical to common standards of right and fairness. In deter-
mining this issue in any particular case the United States
Supreme Court would doubtless consider such factors as tho
seriousness of the offense charged, the financial status of the
accused, the availability of substitutes, such as depositions anc
the nature of the evidence to be cr.uoctecl from the witness.
Right to Assistance of an Interpreter
The right of an accused to tho assistance of an interpreter,
whore necessary to an understanding of tho nature of tho charges
preferred Sigainst him and for the conduct of his defense seems tc
be implicit in tho due process clause, at least to the extent
that a denial thereof would unreasonably "prejudice his case. Ir
Loui Lung et al v Coleman-1 ' the defendants wore of Chinese ex-
traction and unable to understand the English language. They hd
, no t o Hi. supra .
'note 17 supra.
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been arrested on charges of murder. Their counsel requested
permission to consult with them through an interpreter- but were
denied the opportunity to do so unless they would consent to the
use of an interpreter selected by the arresting authorities. The
court held that the due process clause guaranteed an accused the
right to consult with counsel through an interpreter of their own
choice. ''As duo process of law means a course of legal proceeding!
which must proceed according to established procedures and the aid
of legal advice, and means of investigating the charges against
the accused, it would be a denial of the constitutional rights of
one who is held in prison and accused of a crime to refuse counsel
an opportunity to talh with him, unless some one else is present
who may listen to what is said by the accused to his counsel.""^
Perhaps a mere failure to assign an interpreter in the ab-
sence of a request would not constitute a denial of due process
where the , non-English speaking defendant affirmatively entrusts
full authority and discretion to his counsel in investigating the
69
case and conducting the defense.
Right to Counsel
Due procoss, generally speaking, entitles .a defendant to
counsel during trial as well as prior thereto. As in the situa-
tion obtaining prior thereto, the right to counsel during trial
6 8
-p., - ,-
'Felts v iiurpiiy_, note '5>3 supra,
-P.9-
is not absolute and, in general, similar rules apply to both
situations . '
°
An accused is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel during trial where the circumstances of the case make
such assistance essential to a fair hearing. Such factors as
the age of the accused, his previous trial experience, his edu-
cation, the seriousness of the offense charged and the general
trial atmosphere bear upon this issue. These criteria add up
to the question of whether the defendant was reasonably able to
defend himself.
Burden of Proof and Presumption of Innocence
Due process requires the state to assume the burden of
proof in a criminal case. However, it is clea.r that such burde
need not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is
sufficient if the connection between the accused's guilt and
71
the facts proved by the prosecution is rational, xn morrisoi;
v California'^ the court declared that ''the limits are in
substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to ma:
it just for the defendant to be required to repeal what has bee
proved - - - - or at least upon the balancing of the convenient:
and opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will
70See discussion under Right to Counsel Before Tri al
,
pp. 12-15 supra ,
^Hanley v Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929). '
72291*11.8. B2 (193l|J..
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be found to aid the accuser without subjecting the accused to
hardship or oppression,"
Inferences which have been held insufficient to sustain
convictions are as follows : fraud on the part of a bank from
proof of its inability to pay demand deposits,'-' an intent to
defraud an employee of money from proof of breach of a labor
contract. ^ In Western and A. R. Co. v Plenderson'-5 the court
held that negligence on the part of a railroad company could net
be inferred solely from proof of the occurrence of a collision
at a grade crossing.
On the other hand, negligence on the part of a railroad
company may properly be inferred from proof of failure to give
the prescribed warning. '" Likewise, the fact that the accused
has .knowledge of the presence of a distillery apparatus on his
promises may be inferred solely from proof of the presence of the
77
apparatus on his premises,'' Again, prohibited wastage of
natural gas may be properly inferred solely from proof of the
escape of gas into' the air.' L
7°
In Leland v Oregon' J the court held that due process does
not forbid a state to require a defendant who pleads insanityXT O O
73llanley v Georgia; note 71 supra.
ffiBailey v Alabama , 219 U.S." 219 "(1911).
• 5279 u.',s . 639 (1929 )
.
^Atlantic Coast Lino*I(_.FU v Pord, 287 U.S. £02 (1933).
(
,1Hawes v" Geor'gi a > 2^8
"
U . 3 . l"Tl 922 )
,
fgEandini Pe'troleuni Co. v Superior Ct., 2oL|. U.S. 8 (1931).
' v353U.sr 790 (1952) >
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a defense to prove the same beyond a roasonablo doubt. Again,
in Howard v Fleming ° the court held that due process does not
require a trial judge of a state court to give the jury instruc
tions on the presumption of innocence.
Involuntary Confessions and Self-incrimination
Confessions obtained from an accused under such circunstan
as to be shocking to a sense of fairness and decency may not be
used against him in a state criminal trial. In "Jatts v Indiana
a confession was obtained after prolonged detention in solitary
confinement, without arraignment or advice as to his Constitu-
tional rights and after extended questioning by relays of polic
officers. The court held that this procedure violated due
process. Convictions for murder were reversed on similar groun
in Turner v PennsylvaniaUc- and in Harris v South Carolina.-5 I:
Brown v i lississip ;i u •" the court held that the use of brutality
and violence, without more, in obtaining a confession rendered
the activities inimical to duo process. furthermore, the Supra
Court is not bound by a finding by a state court jury that a
confession in a murder trial x/as voluntary, but determines that
£?191 u.s. 126 (1903).
ol333 b.s. [1.9 (191+9).
o?338 U.S. 62' (19'|.9)
81
'338 U.S. 68 (19U9).
•297 U.S. 273 (1936).
..
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question from the evidence of record.
^
a/
In Lyons v Oklahoma the court declared that coerced con-
fessions were repugnant to due process because they offended
"basic standards of justice, not because the victim had a legal
grievance against the police, but declarations procured by
torture are not promises from which a civilized forum will infer
guilt, !I However, whore a second confession is obtained by other
than coercive means twelve hours after the defendant has made the
On
first under duress, due process is not violated.
The reception in evidence of an involuntary confession in
those cases where there is other compelling evidence against thi
accused would probably not violate due process to the extent of
vitiating the conviction. A conviction based upon such total
evidence would not appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's
sense of ordered liberty,
unlike involuntary confessions, protection against self-
incrimination is not included within the duo process clause. In
83
Twining v Hew Jersey ' the court declared that immunity from
self-incrimination was not to be included as ''an immutable prin-
ciple of justice ;: or as a "fundamental right," Accordingly, a
trial judge in a state court may properly instruct the jury that





they may draw an Inference of cmilt from a failure of the dc-!b'
fondant to comment upon the state's evidence. " In Pikes v
Alabama-' the trial judge had ruled that the defendant in an
attempted rape case could not take the stand to testify con-
corning the voluntariness of his confession without subjecting
himself to crocs -examination upon the issue of hie guilt or
innocence. The Supreme Court did not Include this ruling in
their various reasons for holding that the defendant was denied
due process. And in Palko v Connecticut) 7 *1- the court observed
that many thoughtful students of criminology look upon the
immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit. Consistent there
with the court in Adams on v California^ hold that the prosecute
could properly comment noon the accused's failure to explain or
deny the evidence adduced against him.
The Supreme Court lias never, had occasion to rule upon the
question of whether an accused could be compelled to take the
stand, over his objection, for the purpose of testifying against
himself although dicta In Snyder v i Massachusetts 7 ^ declared that
such procedure is appropriate at least In the absence of objecti
Convictions Based Upon Perjured Testimony








testimony. The Constitutional requirement of duo process "can; )t
bo doomed to be satisfiod by mere notice and hearing if a state
has contrived a conviction through the pro tense of a trial which,
in truth, is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the
orosontation of testimony icnown to be perjured. Such a contriv-
ance .is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation. i! 'd
Soarches and Seizures
Unreasonable searches and seizures by state authorities for
use in state criminal trials are net proscribed by the duo process
clause cf the fourteenth Amendment • I'^~ fact, extreme measure
are tolerated in effecting such searches and seizures. Thus, in
Irvine v California' state police entered the defendant's dwelling
while he was temporarily absent therefrom and installed in a bod-
room a microphone which enabled them later to hear incriminating
conversation, It was held that duo procoss v;as not thereby
violated. Apparently, howovor, the Supremo Court's leniency is
conditioned partly, at least, uoon the supposition that the state
does not affirmatively sanction arbitrary police incursions into
privacy 3.n0. that there Deists an alert public opinion to act as a
restraint upon such activity.'^
^Hooncjr v Ilolahan, 2% U.S. 103 (193£).
^National Safe" Dbbosit Jo. v Stead, 232 U.S. >0 (19110.
&%TTf.s: izs '(i9syy.
JjJ-f.. v Colorado, note 3 pipnra.
Rights of an Accused Accorded toy Due Process Subsequent
to Trial
There remains to too considered those rights guaranteed bg
the due Process clause of the Fourteenth AropA.iopt to an accuc
person which arise subsequent to trial. His possible right to
bail is included anions those rights although it could as logicA
toe discussed elsewhere. In any event 9 any right to bail which
h
ma:;' possess would apply equally prior to trial as subseruoiit
thereto
-
Cruel and Unusual Ptinishmonts
A. state retains a wide discretion in proscribing punishr.icri
for violations of its local laws. 7 Undoubtedly the United
States Supreme Court, in line with the general Constitutional
OQ
tost laid down m tho Palko case"' would not declare a parti cuL
s mtoncc repugnant to due process unless it vould ''subject (t'-o
defendant) to a hardship so acute that our polity will not on-
nop
dure it." In the Collins case a sentence to fourteen pears
imprisonment for perjury was held to too not u;-cossivo. Id .Cp
1 (P
oarto iCorsalor the court h^JC that the infliction of a death
penalty top electrocution is not cruel and unusual within the
moaning of the fourteenth A londrnont . A way of die turn, however,
^r.,ippjjpj'1 ". - 2?iAAi?ip» ?~y( u « 3 * £°? o^s.
note ' £T sunra.
_^rnoto 9o surra.
1jL 136 U.S.ITJS" '0390).
the court in the latter case declared that the infliction of
torture or a lin: orin.r. death such as burning at the stake,
crucifixion, breaking at the wheel and the like would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. The imposition of successively
heavier penalties upon repeat offenders does not constitute a
102
cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, a state may subject
a person to a second ordeal of electrocution where the first was
unsuccessful duo to a failure of the equipment, -^3
Rifdtit to Appeal
Due process docs not accord a defendant any rir.hts as to
rohoarinc.s, new trials or appeals.*-^' :,T Jidc discretion " !ust be
loft to the states for the manner of adjudicating a claim that
a conviction is unconstitutional. A state may decide whether
to have direct appeals., --...- and if so, under what circum-
stances - - - - and may Provide that protection ----- be
s oiv. lit through the writ of habeas corpus or corum nobis (or) nay
afford remedy by a simple -notion brought either in the court of
original conviction or at the place of detention.' 1 "" In James v
A-y.cV' the court held that the Point at rhich criminal litiga-
tion must cease is best determined by the state itself and that
there is no provision in the Federal Constitution which forbids
'-Graham v Jest Virginia, note "#'. supra.
'
'Y'Lpuisiana ox rol Prr7ncis v ResweboV, ;29 TJ.S. ':3'9 (19«'7;«
103
^iclane v I)nFs¥on7 l^VUTs . iSe>" (?Wi)\
"'Qgoarter v Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (19?'.o).
lObTqp" ti'fa •*! otrTTorT). \ - .92 "J."S. •1P. (TT19U}[ )
.
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a state's granting an; tribunal the final do termination of lo.r,al
issues
.
Ri-;.;ht of Access to the Courts and Hail
Due process £uaranteos a convicted "ocrson accoss to bho
courts for the purposo of s col:ins rectification of lcp,al errors
committed at his trial a However, the state has the final
authority to determine the procedure to be followed and the
tribunal to which the application for relief is to be made,
A prisoner map not be required to submit legal papers to the
erison warden prior to ~>otitionin;j] a Federal court for a writ
of habeas corpus, Her a 7 a 'orison warden denp a orisoncr ac
cess to the courts unless ho first obtains counsel to represent
The due "oroccss clause of the Fourteenth A'" cade out docs not
require a state to ecrmit a 'orisoncr to furnish bail.""" On the
other hand, whore bail is authorized it must not be excessive
111
uncler all the circumstances of the case.
Oo:ec' ! usion
fie due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is sub-
stantially less sweonina; in the Protection it affords accused
^8-
persons against action. by stato yoYornmontal agencies than is
perhaps ^onorally assumod, None whatever is afforded as to self-
incrimination, uso of hoarsay evidence, unreasonable searches
and seizures, trial by jury, bail, indictment by f.rand jury or
appeal to hifjaer state courts. That affordod as to double
.joopardy is considerably loss than that afforded in Federal
courts. Evidence, sufficient to justify conviction of an accused
is far less than that quantum thereof essential to convince
beyond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps a moro ^rcooridcrancc or only
substantial ovidonco is sufficient. In all other categories of
individual riyhts and freedoms, which the United States Supro"a
Court has thus far had occasion to comment upon, due process
yuarantcos only that state encroachments thereon shall not be
unreasonable in the liaht of all the circumstances of the case.
It should be emphasized that the Suorcmc Court's conception
of the content of the due process clause appears to be in a state
of evolutionary chan;,e. During the last decade Just aces Slack
and Doualas and the late Justices IIur*">h.y and Rut"1 gc:,,c. in cor-
tain vigorous dissenting opinions, declared that most if not all
of the first oueeht amendments to the Perioral Constitution v/orc
incorporated into the 7ourtoonth A ae.O. ant . But Justices
lurphy ana Rutlcdso arc dead. Of i:ho throe new justices, Harlan
11has already alianod himself with the conservatives on th; court.
-Setts v Brady., note 2 sirora; Gavos v ITpw York, 332 U.3
1 1 1 ' (1 Q).7 f
11 x
1?2-}Z9®„ v Alabama, note 2? supra.
„^o_
The Chief Justice probably tends to share the views of J^sti.ccs
Slack end Dou las, Ac corCLrcX]7 » irros-.-»octivo of Justice 3rcnna:-
philosophy as to civil rights the majority of the present court
is still apparently committed to the traditional tests of due
Process. "3c that as it may, the Su.pror.io Court certainly has nc
com .itted itself irrevocably to any fined conception of due
recess. In Wolf v Colorado11
'
1 the court specifically rejected
anv such inclination in pointing out that to do so would "ignore
the movements of a free soeiet-j. a The \ain drift of the Court'..
thinking is undoubtedly towards extending the benefits of due
process
.
Judicial procedures, other than those familiar to Americans
\;ould not necessarily run afoul of the proscriptions of the duo
procoss clause. No one familiar with the laws relating to Unite;
Stater: armed forces personnel could seriously contend that thel
afford fewer rights and safeguards than those implicit in the
fourteenth Amendment. V.Tacthcr ;Iduc process' 1 is denied by the
judicial systems of the European members of the ITorth Atlantic
Treaty Organization will be examined in the following chapter.
"
""
rnetc 3 suprs .
-li.O-
CHAPTER III A CRITICAL STUDY OE LA"JS OP FOREIGN COUITTRIES
CONOLUDBD A3 A RESULT OP THE SENATE RESOLUTION
American aimed forces arc stationed in the majority, if not
?11, of tho North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations. Howovc
,
tho largo propondoranco of these forces are restricted to those
nations whose criminal laws are derived from the codo criminc
1
of
Franco, The organic structures of the logal systems of those
nations are basically similar, although local conditions and
• other factors have, caused some differences in particular areas.
~
Generally speaking, therefore, any conclusions relating to indi-
vidual rights and safeguards guaranteed by the criminal laws of
any particular such nation are applicable to tho others.
Widespread differences of opinion ovist as to the relative
merits of the common law ana the civil law (based upon the
criminal code of France) as to their efficacy in affording pro-
tection to what are commonly conceived as tho basic rights of
an accused person. Critics of the civil law maintain that it
excessively stresses the powor of the state over the individual.
Students of the civil law, on the other hand, aver that the
common law tends too much to protect tho guilty at the expense of
the state and stubbornly refuse to concede : '.uch, if any, superior
merit tc the common law. As one French cor.n'iontat.or put it, "If I
Luxembourg; Law and the ITATO Status of Forces Agreement (a
study wr spared by. Judge' Aclvbc at o Division,' fie a'dlfuartors, TJ§*AREUR
1955; PP. 5-6.
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Iwere innocent, I wouldn't care whether I wore tried in Inglanl
or in Franco f but if I wore guilty, I would prefer to bo tried
ir: 3nglandi!
Prior to considering the relative merits of the civil law
as compared to American law under the due process clause of th;
Fourteenth Aniondmont as they relate to the protection of accuft
persons in criminal trials it will be profitable to briefly
examine the procedures omployod by the authorities of civil la;
nations in prosecuting a defendant for an alleged offense. The
procedure j described herewith, is followed in Franco but, as
noted above, substantially similar procedures obtain in all civ
law nations,
French Criminal Procedure
An important part of French criminal procedure is the
preparatory examination which may, depending upon the circum-
stances, procodo the trial proper. The preparatory examination
is obligatory with respect to crimes , " is optional with respect
to dolit 3 I* and is generally dispensed with entirely in cases
involving contraventions ,- Con
t
rayont i ons ere generally ref err




~Voui.ii, T/w. Prot ection of the Accused in French Criminal
Pro-coduro, 5 International and Comparative Law ^uartorTy, 3 D-'
pOrTonscs punishable by penal servitude,, hard labor, or d
4-Offcnsos punishable by fines of variable amounts and. im-
prisonment not to exceed five years.
5hinor offenses, punishable by a maximum of ton days im-
prisonment and a fine not to oxcecd the equivalent of §75.00.
-!i2~
The Preparatory Sxamination
The object of tho preparatory examination is to determine
whether there exists suffioiont evidence of guilt to '/arrant
referring the accused to trial, It is conducted by a magistr o
called the jugc d ' ins true tion, who is assisted by a public pro-
secutor, called a pro curour.
Host cases are referred to the J_ug_e_ d'_insj^ruj3j:ion. by the
pro curcur, although certain private citizens and organizations
also possess this right of referral and occasionally exercise it.
Prior to making any referrals to the Jugc d * ins true t ion the
"STPS^^P-^. ^s charged with the duty of making an inquiry into tho
alleged offense. This Inquiry may bo, and usually is, accomplish^
by the police. It Is followed by the procurour's decision as to
whether or .not he will press the case further. If the urocureur
decides not to pursue the case further it is closed, unless any
victim of the offonso commences a civil action against the
alleged offender. In this event the victim, in effect, assumos




If tho ripocureur (or tho victim, if there is one) decides
to prosecute the case and the case Involves a crime he must
refer it to the jugp d ' instruction for a preparatory examination;
if the ease involves a delit he has the option of referring the
Vbuin, The Protection of the Accused in French
_
Criminal
Procedure, note 2 s upjra, pT'lT/
4l3~
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caso to the JTi&o or directly to the appropriate tribunal foi
trial.
7
.Jhorc the PJ^curjDur ^ or vie tin) refers the case to the
Jilj-C_. .J?^Jhptration the latter proceeds with bhe preparatory
examination. Tho jugo is charged by law to pursue his examiuf
tion impartially and in the sole interests of justice, which
requires an equal verification of the evidence xrhcther offered
by the state or the accused. The hearing is essential!;/ inqui-
sitorial in nature since the jugc may actively participate in
eliciting evidence. All evidence, which is reasonably probative
is admissible for consideration provided only that it was legal!
obtained. In addition, the jug o may, and generally does, make
extensive use of any available police files.
Upon opening the preparatory examination the
.i" up,o *s first
duty is to verify the identity of the accused. The jugc must
then advise the accused of the nature of the offense charged
against him. lie extends to the accused the privilege of making
any statement he may desire after advising him that ho need not
make any. The accused is also accorded the right to be assigned
counsel if one is desired. These formalities are mandatory in
the preparatory examination except where circumstances justify
their omission. They may be omitted when it is necessary to




is apprehended in the very act of the com lis s ion of the offense
by the polico.
°
The jugje is obligated to prop arc a written record of the





It is admissible against the accused
in any criminal trial to which he may be referred. If regularly
prepared its probative value is high. Before a tribunal simplo
police or a tribunal corro c t ionncl a regularly prepared process
verbal constitutes authentic proof of its contents until the
contrary is proven. However, if it contains material irregulari-
ties its probative value before such courts is considerably
reduced and may no longer constitute prima facie evidence of
guilt, .hen used before a court of assise a process verbal j
even though regularly prepared, is assigned only that evident:', ay
weight considered proper by the judges and jurors," and nay, in
no event, constitute of itself, prima facie evidence of guilt.
Upon the completion of the preparatory examination the
iugo d f instruction decides whother to dismiss the case or to
refer it further for trial. Any decision to dismiss the case
is final. If he decides that the case merits prosecution and
the offense constitutes only a edit he nest generally refers
o
"./right, French Criminal Proceduro, Ij5> haw Quarterly
Reviow, 337,
' Basic Guarantees in Criminal Actions in France under the
Status of Fore 03 Agreement fa*' study prepared by the Office of the
Staff Judge Advocate, Hoadquartors, USAR3UR Communication Zone,
A? 5G 3 TJ~ • S . Army ) pp . 13-16; Luxembourg Law and t_he_ NATO Stat i is
pX .Ear. P. ejg. Agro erne nt , no t o 1 supra , pp . ij. " -30
.




t ionnc 1 (though i
he nay conceivably refer it to a tribunal simple police ) . If ,'.|
offense involves a criiao and ho decides that it merits prosecu-
tion ho must refer it to a certain board of officials for a
second preparatory examination. This board is called the chanbri
des nisos on aecus at ion. In theory, at least, its purpose is
to doubly insure the likelihood of the accused's guilt prior to
referring him to formal: trial. The chambre conducts its examine
tion in secret. It is strictly inquisitorial in nature and is
surrounded by none of those safeguards implicit in the cxamina-
tion conducted by the ju.^c d' instruc tion. " ' Upon its completion
of the proceedings the chambro determines whether to dismiss
the charges or to prosecute then. If it dismisses the case, its
action Is final. On the other hand, if it decides that the
charges should be prosecuted, it refers them, to the court of
assize
.
Thus, an accused may eventually be tried by cither a
tribunal Simple police, a tribunal c o rrc c t ionnc 1 or a court of
assize, depending upon the seriousness of the offense and to
some extent, the discretion of the nrocureur. A brief descrip-
tion of those three types of Prenoh criminal courts follows.
^7ouin, The- Protecti on of tho Accused in French Criminal
»oco dure;, note 2 supra, p. 22.
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Tribunal Simple Police
Tribunaux simple pplico are informal criminal courts with
limited jurisdiction. They may bo likonod to justice of the
peaco courts in the United States,
Tribunal Correctionnol
The tribunaux correetionnels, like the tribunaux simple
police, arc informal courts. The proceedings start with the
examination of the accused. The ovidonce is then heard or, more
often than not, simply read from the witness , prepared statc-
monts, Witnesses need not attend in person. The accused, how-
ever, must appear in person unless the case involved is of a
minor nature or unless the accused has departed from the country.
The prosecutor and the accused may present arguments to the
court and the accused is permitted the final argument. The court
may render its judgment immediately or may reserve it for some
later sitting. Appeals lie to a superior court called the ehambre
of appeals.
Court of Assise
The court of assize is a special criminal forum. It consi 'js
of three judges and seven jurors. One of these judges acts as
11 «








the president of the courts. He exercises considerable control
over the proceedings, having the power ;,to reject anything whic
would tend to prolong the proceedings without the hope of more
certainty in the results. J The proceedings are inquisitorial
in nature, ''And above all and independently of the evidence an-
argument presented by the parties he must make a personal effor'
of his own to clarify all the circumstances of the crime in
,l!i
order to lead the court to the discovery of the truth. ,l ' The
role of the two assistant judges is comparatively minor. The
guilt or innocence of the accused and any appropriate sentence
are determined by a majority vote of the three judges and the
seven jurors acting as a unit.
An official of the court of assize, called the procureur, :
charged with certain pre-trial functions. He draws up the char.
serves the charges on the accused, advises the accused of the
v
identity of any adverse witnesses xihich will be called to testif
and insures the presence of the accused at the trial.
At the trial proper the charges are first read by a clerk
of the court. The president thereupon launches into an examina-
tion of the accused. The scope of this examination is unlimited
and may encompass the entire history of the accused, so long as
the questions relate to matters relevant either to his guilt or
13
~\/ouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal.
Procedure , note 2 supra, p. 1?T6*,
" IZj-Ibid.
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innocence of the crime charged or to an appropriate sentence in
the event of his conviction. After the examination of the
accused witnesses are called for questioning. These must be
heard in person their evidence may not be given by a mere reading
of their prepared statements as is the case before a tribunal
correctionnel . Witnesses are permitted to speak freely and may
not be interrupted by either side. As a result almost no
restraints upon relevancy of evidence may be imposed uoon them.
After the direct testimony of the witness, questions may be put
to them by the president or through him by the parties to the
trial or by the members of the jury.
After the evidence has been taken the court hears arguments
by the parties. The accused is always permitted the closing
argument. Finally, the court deliberates upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused and any sentence, if appropriate. A
bare majority of the judges and jurors is sufficient to convict
or to decide the sentence.
Prom the foregoing brief discussion it is apparent that
French criminal trial procedure (and therefore that of other
civil lax; nations ) places substantially more importance upon pre-
trial formal investigations and correspondingly less importance
upon trials themselves, than is true in the United States. Any
fair comparison of the two systems of criminal justice as they
pertain to the rights and safeguards of accused persons must,
therefore, include those implicit in the preparatory examination.
-4+9-
The remarks which follow Include reference to the Preparatory
examination when appropriate. For convenience, those rights
and safeguards afforded defendants by the criminal procedures
of civil law nations will be considered in the same order as
they were considered in the preceding chapter.
Rights of Accused Persons Before Trial in Civil Law
Nations
Pre-trial rights accorded accused persons under the civil
law are, in general, approximately equivalent to those implicit
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution.
Intelligibility of Penal Statutes
Penal statutes in civil law nations must conform to sub-
stantially the same standards of clarity of language as state
criminal statutes in the United States. The Declaration and the
Rights of Man and the Citizen of 17 8
9
forms the basis for the
criminal procedures of all civil law nations. Paragraph 8 of
the Declaration provides as follows : 'aNo man may be accused,
arrested or detained except in the cases and according to the
procedure described by law. n Under this organic document
offenses must be based upon some specific and positive orovisic
of law. 1^
•^Luxembourg Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
no te 1 s upra




The civil law affords ample protection to accused persons in
apprising then of the nature of criminal charges preferred against
them. At the tune 'he is served with a summons to appear in court
the accused is served with written charges. These charges must
include reference to the specific law allegedly violated. In
those cases referred 'for investigation at a preparatory examina-
tion the juge d* instruction is charged by law with fully advising
the accused at the outset of the examination of the nature of the
offense or offenses he is suspected of having committed. At the
completion of the preparatory examination written charges must be
preferred against the accused if the juge decides to further
prosecute him. In addition, continuances are granted as a matter
of right if necessary for the accused to prepare his defense.
Right to Counsel
The accused is entitled as a matter of right to the assist-
ance of counsel at tho preparatory examination. However, the
effectiveness of counsel is severely restricted in that adverse
witnesses may be examined out of the presence of the accused or
his counsel. Counsel may be present as a matter of right at the
preparatory examination only when the accused is being examined.
Evon then he cannot, as a matter of right, put questions directly
l65Li-l->' P?/ l3° f-'«
„.-5i-
to tho witness. Tho ^^e^d'Jj.istini^ion may restrict him to the
right to merely assort that certain questions out to the witness
by the juge_ arc improper and request him to take such steps as
may be necessary to ascertain the truth. Failure of the juge tc
take appropriate action after such protests may render the
proceedings irregular so as to adversely affect the probative
value of the resulting pro cess vc rb al . '
Since the pro cos s ye rbal is of potentially critical im-
portance at any subsequent trial tho preparatory examination is,
in a very real sense, part of the trial proper. Unavailability
of assistance of counsel, as he is employed in the United States
could, at tho preparatory examination, therefore, harm an ac-
cused's case. On the other hand, similar conclusions could be
made with respect to equivalent denials in American courts and
due process iiould not necessarily be violated.
Right to Grand Jury
The criminal pro ccdurcs of civil law nations make no pro-
visions for grand juries, as such. The preparatory examinatic.
conducted by tho .luge d* instruction , is mandatory as to all type?
°£ cr ime s , as distinguished from del it s and contraventions and
constitutes an effective substitute therefor.
jj-jlbid., pp. 71-72.
Basic Guarantees in Criminal Actions in Prance unde r the
Status of Forces Agreement
,
note 9 suora, p. 29.'
-£2~
Double Jeopardy
The civil law docs not proscribe double jeopardy except
under certain circumstances. Either the government or the ac-





tribunaux simple polic e on cither law or fact. Upon any retrial
of the case as the result of such appeal the new tribunal is not
limited in its sentence by any sentence imposed by the former
tribunal. In courts of assize either party may appeal but only
as to errors of law.
Ex Post Pacto Laws
The Declaration and the Rights of Han and the Ci tizens of
1789 expressly provides that ;, I To man can be punished except by a
pro-existing law." Civil law criminal codes express the same
idea in substantially the seme languago. The French Code expresses
it in the following words: "No petty offense, no misdemeanor, no
felony can bo punished with penalties that viorc not definitely the
law before the offenses wore committed* " Howovcr, six exceptions
to the rule are normally permitted.
Interpretive law constitutes one such exception. These laws
are considered to be integral parts of the laws to which they




A law which amolioratos the method of executing sentences
nay relate back, in point of time, to the law affected thereby]
A third such exception is made to laws which deal with
measures of state security.
Laws which arc less severe than those replaced may be made]
retroactive to the effective dates of the laws replaced. This
is perhaps the most important exception to the general rule, in
point of frequency of occurrence. Certain problems may arise
with respect to this exception in determining which is the less
severe law and the application of the less severe of the laws.
Laws which modify the formalities of legal procedure con-
stitute still another exception to the general rule. This type
of law cannot, however, retroactively alter an accused's right
to be tried by certain courts nor may they adversely affect the
substantial rights of the accused.
Finally, statutes of limitations may operate retroactively,
provided that the law to which the former and shorter statute of
limitations applied has been replaced by a law which is less




Rights of an Accused During Trial . in Civil Law Nations
Specific rights and safeguards accorded accused persons
^Ibid
. , pp. 5-3.
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during trial by civil law nations may be more or loss substantial
than corresponding rights and safeguards guaranteed accused in
state courts in the United States. Perhaps the greatest weaknesses
exist in civil law notions of witness confrontation and cross-
examination. On the other hand, much time is devoted to the
preparatory examination in serious offenses which, when conducted
fairly and impartially, tends to increase the procedural safe-
guards afforded accused.
Trial by Impartial Tribunal
Civil law procedures afford reasonable assurance of the com-
petence and impartiality of those authorities responsible for
formal investigations and trials of accused persons *
The jugc d 'ins true t ion, who is the magistrate in control of
the preparatory examination, is charged by law to inquire im-
partially into the facts of cases brought buforc him. As a
practical matter, however, the competence and fairness of his
report (the p ro c o s s verba1 ) depend to a marked degree upon his
personal character. In Prance, at least, he is directly res-
ponsible to the Ilinistor of Justice and receives his appointments
from him for periods of thrc<~ years each. He occupies a rather
lot; position in the French judicial hierarchy and is not ./ell
paid. His dependence upon the minister for advancement and other
benefits, therefore, is obvious and so he may be vulnerable to




may, and ofton doos, make usu of a so-callod ;,dologated oxaminj
ticn 1 ' whereby ho shifts the main burden of his examination to
police, Thi3 practice may well cause his attitude to be ovcrl;
influenced by the opinions of tho police.
Procedural safeguards., pertaining to tribunals, provide nor
assurance for tho impartiality and competence of judges and jurf?
fhe accused may chall ingc the judges and jurors for cause on a
number of grounds and ho may peremptorily challenge four jurorsr
Right to Jury Trial
Juries are employed in criminal proceedings of civil Ian
nations only in the courts of assize, which havo exclusive
jurisdiction ovce grimes or felonies. Jurors are draxm by lot
until seven arc selected. Those selected must moot certain
minimum statutory requirements. Ample opportunity for challcngfe)
any juror for cause is afforded the accused. The function of til
jury is limited to assist in deciding the guilt or innocence of
the accused and any sontenco, ./ben appropriate. The three judges
vote with, the jurors on those issues and a majority of six judges
-
.
. . . , . .
.... 23
and jurors, in any combination, is decisive
.
Confrontation. Right to Cross-Examine Adverse VJitncssJ
There exists no right on tho part of the accused to be
confronted with adverse witnesses in either tho preparatory
21 Vouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal
supra, p. 157?roc e dure , note 2
-'-Easic Guarant cos in Criminal Acti ons in Franco under tiu
S^JiH3 of Forces Agreement, note 9 supra*, p. 9.
23*Ib I'd
.
~ pp . 31-32 . .'.
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examination, tho tribunal sjo.iplc police, or the tribunal corro
c
-
tionnol. The jugo d* instruction and. the two above named courts
do j howoyor, have discretionary authority to permit such con-
frontation. 1-^" It is entirely possible, therefore, for an accused
to be convicted of a contrav
o
ntion or a dolit without ever havi:.
secn a wi tno s s
.
On tho other hand, witnesses must bo heard in person before
courts of assize. Their evidence may not be given there by a
25
mere reading of their prepared statements. However, the rioht
and cpportunit3' to cross-examine adverse witnesses are practically
non-oxistant oven in the court of assize. ; '- - - - the art of
cross -examination* if it exists at all in France, has but a spark
of life. No one seems to know how to dissect a statement into
its, component parts, find out hidden contradictions and cut
through equivocations, generalizations or hearsay to the essence
of the facts within the witness 1 own knowledge . !,L- To add to this
serious handicap of lack of skill on the part of counsel in civil
law courts, all questions must be put to the witness through the
president of the court.
Right to be Present at Trial
Civil law procedures differ in certain aspects from those of
^ilbld., p. 2I4.
,
/'right, French Criminal, Procedure, 8 suera, p. 100.
26
±LDid .» P. 99.
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the common law with respect to chc requirements for the accused
presence at his trial. The jurisdiction of the criminal court,
under the civil law, is not dependent upon personal service of
process on the accused. An accused is, at. most, afforded an op*
eortunit;-;/ to be present at his trial if he so desires. If he
fails to appear in court, having been extended an opportunity to
do so, he may be arraigned, tried and sentenced in absentia.
Thus, where an accused has departed from the territory of a civi:
law nation, criminal jurisdiction may be acquired over him throu,;
service of ^recess by mail, addressed to his latest known addreis
Obviously, the execution of any sentence to imprisonment must
await his return to the country. Ho. /ever, fines may be collect!'
by levying execution upon any property which the accused may hav.
situated in the country.
In addition to the possibility of collecting fines from an
accused, certain other reasons have been assigned for permitting
trials in absentia in civil law nations. "- - •- - (1) There is
a vindication of national pride, in that it is possible to have
final adjudication of every penal offense against the law of the
country. (2) It means that there is a final disposition of all
pending cases, so that the files In the office of the local
"eroseciitor can be closed. (3) It presents a very effective
--'Snco end ?yc
, £. Report on the Factual Operation of
Article VII of the Status of Forces Agreement (Georgetown Univ.
Law Center), p."" ~G£~Xly%6T.
--£8-
moans, without the necessity of denying a visa or refusing
admission, of kooping undo sirod persons out of the country. - - -
.
(lj. ) Finally, through a joinder of criminal and civil actions,
such a judgment on the criminal side of the court enables an in-
jured civil party to have its damages assessed in the civil ac-
tion and to recover from any insurance company to the extent of
liability. ; '28
But even in th'oso cases •where an accused appears at his
trial his right to remain present during all stages thereof is
not absolute. A court is empowered to order his removal from
the court room while a witness is being interrogated provided
that his physical prosence would interfere with ascertaining th
29truth from the particular witness.
Right to Prompt, Speedy and Public Trial
In general tho accused has the right to a public trial in
civil law countries. However, tribunals do possess discretionary
power to order closed hearings where open hearings would likely
result in injury to public order and morals. Closed hearings may
never be ordered in the sole interests of the parties to tho
trial. In _car,icra proceedings are the exception to tho rule,
abuse of discretion in closing a court to the public will render
28... .
„ ,/Ibid., p. 66.




the proceedings a nullity.
However, it must bo kept in mind that an important part of
the pro so cut ion T s case may consist of tho p ro c cs s verbal pre-
pared by tho ,jugc d » ins truction as tho result of tho preparatory
examination. iluch, if not all, of the evidence accepted by the
;jur;° r,ia7 have been obtained from witnesses who gave their tosti-
mony out of the presence of the accused, his counsel or tho publ
No one has the right to bo present at the preparatory cxaminatic;
when witnesses are being examined. At most, the jugo is obliged
to make all documents in his file available to tho accused twont
four hours prior to each questioning of tho accused. By con-
ducting his examination of tho accused prior to examining tho
witnesses the jugo can deprive an accused oven of this limited
right.
On the other hand, there is no positive assurance that a
criminal trial will bo either promptly begun or speedily con-
eluded. No positive laxr exists which compels trials to bo con-
ducted within minimum time limits. Certain provisions of law,
however, do tend to accelerate certain portions of the criminal
proceedings. Thus, the court of assize must insure that tho
accused is interrogated within twenty four hours after the
receipt of tho process verbal by tho clerk of court. At the
preparatory examination the jugc d' instruction must interrogate
]?Ibid., pp. 93-9^
.
-^Vouin, The Protection of the 'Accus'od in French Criminal
Procodur c , note 2 supra , p . 17.
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the accused within twenty four hours after any arrest of the
accused. Furthermore, it is In the interest of the jugo
d ' ins truetion to conduct a prompt and speedy investigation to
insure that the evidence docs not become stale. In spite of the
foregoing considerations, however, investigations and trials of





Right to Compulsory Fix) cess for the Attendance of
Hitnossos
The civil law includes ample provisions for insuring the
presence of witnesses in criminal trials. In general, an ac-
cused may cause as many witnesses as ho may desire to be summoned,
subject only to the condition that he notify the public prose-
cutor of their identity twenty four hours prior to trial, 33
Right to Counsel
The civil law unconditionally assures the assignment of
counsel to the accused in all cases whore one is expressly re-
quested and, in certain cases, even whore none is desired. Thus,
in trials before trjJsunaux s imple 'epJLicc_ and tribunaux correc -
tionnels the option is left to the accused. If he requests
32Basi c Guarantees in Criminal Acti ons in France under the
Status of Forces' Agreement, note. 9 supra, pp". 17alB".
33lbid .", p. 22. " See also Luxembourg Law and the NATO Status
2JL Forcos _Agreement , no t e 1 supr a , p p" . 175-177.
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counsel one will bo furnished him; if ho declares that none is
desired ho nay proceed with his defense without one. On the ols
hand, counsel is furnished accused who are tried by courts of
assize, irrespective of their expressed desires.^
•
Right to Assistance of an Interpreter
An interpreter is furnished, as a matter of right, to ac-
cused who are unfamiliar with the native language, in trials by
courts of assize. Similarly the jugo d 1 ins
t
ruet ion is oblige &I
appoint an interpreter where necessary in the preparatory exami




police o r trib unaux co rr octi :?nnol &_*
Burden of Proof and Presumption of Innocence
Any discussion concerning the burden of proof and any
presumption of innocence inherent in the criminal procedures of
civil law nations must take into account the preparatory oxamii
tion, since the process verbal
,
prepared by the ,jug e d 'ins true
t
may, of itself in certain cases, constitute prima facie ovidcrJi
of the guilt of the accused.
In the preparatory examination the jugo d
'
ins truct ion may
not recommend an accused for trial unless he Is persuaded of th
IPJrA • ? PP • 16-17. Sec al s o Wright , French Criminal j^roj
c od uro. note 8 sunra
,
p . 92.
55Dasi c Gu.n.^?.ntoos in Criminal Actions in France under the
Status of Forces 'Agreement , 'note 9 supra/ pe.: ],5"-I7; "//right,
French Criminal Procedure, note 3 supra, p. 92.
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accused's guilt to tho oxtont of an intimo conviction, which sig-
nifies a ''profound personol conviction 11 of guilt. -* The same
rule applies to the trial itself, Basic to French jurisprudence
is the doctrine that doubts are resolved in favor of the accused.-5
Consistent with placing the burden of proof on the prosecu-
tion, the civil law presumes that the accused is innocent unti?
the contrary is proven. If - - - - the whole system of French
criminal procedure is based, as in England, on the presumed
innocence of the accused. The principle is categorically laid
dov/n in tho fauous Declaration of tho Rights of IIan of 1789. 1 '-
Oncc a prima facie case has been established, however, any
failure of the accused to rebut or explain the evidence may
operate to strengthen the credibility of that evidence. How-
over, ''the silence of the prosecution. ------ the failure
of the accused to speak for himself or to bring witnesses on his
own behalf (may, but need not cause the court to) infer that he
has no evidence to rebut the already sufficient evidence made
out by the prosecution, i! -* '
Involuntary Confessions. Self - Incrimination
All confessions, irrespective 'of their voluntary or in-
voluntary nature, arc admissible against the accused In criminal
3yVouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal
Procedure ,, note 3 supra
, p . 15
.
3TB~asic Guarantees" in Criminal Actions in Franco under the
S t atus o f F orc es Agr e omcnt , ' no t e 9 £ujora, -°» -9.
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courts of civil lai^ nations . The circumstances under which a
confession was obtained merely affect the evidentiary weight
which may bo assigned to it. The court will accord the con-
fession such probative weight as it considers proper and may
legally convict an accused upon the basis of his confession
alone, provided of course, that the court is thereby persuade
of the accused's guilt "by a profound personal conviction. if Th:
accused may repudiate or disavow his confession for any reason
and such action on his part will be considered in assessing its
woight,^
On the other hand, no accusod may bo compelled to incrinline
himself either before the juge d * ins tru c ti on or a criminal court
"The .guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination which is
found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
is not the subject of any express' provision of the French systoii
of penal procedure. In effect, however, the accused, under
French jurisprudence, enjoys a right which, if anything, is
oven broader than the .American guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion. He has no obligation to make a statement or to answer
questions at any stage of the proceedings, and he need give no
reason for his silence. Indeed, at the preliminary examination
the law imposes upon the juge d 'instruction' the positive duty tc
0-®Basic Guarantees in Criminal Actions in France under the
Status of Force s Agre ement , note 9 supra, n. 25.
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inform him that he has the right to remain silent and a failur
to inform him of this right rondors all remaining procoodings
before the jugd null and void. "^
Searches and Seizures
The juge &_ f insjtru o^tio
n
s the prqeurour and certain other
civilian authorities arc authorized by law to conduct searches
and. seizures in connection with the investigation of alleged
offenses. Such searcher, and seizures are authorized only where
the nature of the alleged offense is such that a search will
likely produce relevant evidence. In general, searches nay be
conducted only in the presence of the accused. They may not be
made at night. Places which may be searched include the accused's
domicile and place of business. ^ Fruits of an illegal search
ar e not a daii s s ib.1 o into evi6 enc e . 3
Convictions Basod upon Perjured Evidence
Convictions allegedly based upon perjured testimony may be
appealed to higher courts. The mor.o assertion of perjured
testimony is sufficient to suspend the execution of the decision
of the court. If the witness „ whose testimony is questioned is
subsequently tried and convicted of perjury the case is remanded
•^Snco and Pye, A Report on the,
.
Actual. Operation of Articl.
VII. of the fftatus of Force
s
Agreement , note ~? sup_ra, p, 6b..
^r^Basic Guarantees in Criminal Actions in Prance under the
.^.h'h^lj3 . of Forces ^rc^aoht," noto Tsrara", p. 29.
'
^^5s°i;'^JPelal?* ^aw and the NATO jftotus of Forces Agreement,
note 1 svp'^y-, p. "71;.'
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for a now trial and the convicted por juror in not competent to
testify at the new trial. On the othor hand, If the alleged
perjury is not established the lower court's decision will be
ordorcd into execution.^'
Gruol end Unusual Punishments
A variety of punishments is authorized by the civil lew to
be imposed upon persons convicted of crime. The severity of thl
piHiishmont in a particular case Is generally proportionate to tL
gravity o~£ the offense found proved. Specific kinds of punishr.iGi:
authorized by the civil law are as follows: death by decapita-
tion, hard labor for life, hard labor for a period of time, im-
prisonment for life, imprisonment for a period of tine, solitary
confine went with hard labor for a period of time, fines, deporta-
tion, exile and loss of Civil rights r^
It is conceivable that a sentence imposed upon an accused
person would be cruel and unusual by American standards if such
sentence die1 not properly take into -ccount the nature of the
offense found proved, the age arid maturity of the accused and tiu
like, or If ho wore denied roligi'ous or similar counsel or if tfl
prison facilities were below those minimum standards of comfort
and sanitation considered essential by Americans, As a practicS
^'.IbidI ,, p. 152.
• JL°S * 9. ^*PQt'antocs in G riminal Tria1 s__in Trance under tin
j§ tatus o t Forcos Agreement , no to 9 suerci
,
" p . 27.
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matter, however, punishment imposed by criminal courts of civil
:
t nations, in the large majority of cases, arc not so execssi
is to offend the due process tost.^
Right to Appeal
Provisions for appoal arc included in the criminal procedures
of all civil law nations. Decisions of the juge d ' ins true t
i
on
are appoalablo on questions of law and fact to the chambro dps
mis es on accusation . Decisions of tribunaux simolc police may
be appealed on questions of lav and fact to tribunaux co rroc -




ne ls^ to the chambro_
dos appols correc tio iinels do la cour d'appcl . Docis ions of the
courts of assize may be appoal od only on questions of law and to
the cour do pas 3 ation. An appeal from an imposition of pre-
ventive detention by the juge d instruction may be made to the
U8chambro des nises en accusation.' 1'
Bail and Preventive Detention
Civil law nations permit an accused bo furnish bail under
certain limited circumstances. It is granted as a matter of
It 9
right in casus of co ntrav entions . i- ' Again, if the offense is
4- Ibid.
, p. 27; Luxembourg Law and the ITATO Status of Forco s
Agrc omen1 1 -no 1 1 • supra, pro. 2JL|.6 -21^7 ."
47Basic -Guarantees i n' Criminal Actions in F r.inc o under the
Status of ?orc e s Apr erne n
t
,
note 9 supra, p. 2k •
If^Youin , The Protection of the Accus ed in French Criminal
Procedure
,
note 2. supra, p. 2C.




a ^-At ?or which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for two
years it is granted as a matter of right in Franco, but only ij
th., accused has a previous clear record and is domiciled in
France. In more serious offenses it is granted only at the
£ldiscretion of the court." Jhcrc bail is granted the court will
normally require a monetary amount sufficient to cover the claim
of any civil part/, court costs and the amount of any fine that
dp
mey" be adjudged.
The juge. gAJins truction has the authority to order an accuse:
to be held in preventive detention in those instances where bail
is not obtainable as a matter of right and where ho considers
such measures necessary to prevent the accused from taking flight
destroying evidence or corrupting witnesses, or to satisfy
public opinion in cases involving heinous crimes or to protect
the accused from the fury of a mob. Preventive detention may
be continuous up to the day of the trial. In case of conviction
til-: period encompassed by the preventive detention is deducted
from any Sentence of confinement and living conditions incident
to preventive detention are superior to those imposed as the
result of a sentence to imprisonment'. Nevertheless, genuine
hardship can result from' an order imposing preventive detention
>%ouin, The Protection of the Accus ed, in French Criminal
Procedure, note 2 supra, p. 20.
^Luxembourg Law" and _tho NATO. Staturg of Forces' Agreement,
note 1 supra, ' "0. 190.
• 521bi"d.
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and the time olapsing between tho preparatory examination and the
trial can "be very long. J
Conclusion
Protection afforded accused persons by the criminal pro-
cedures of civil law nations substantially equals that afforded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a number
of specific areas. Included therein are the following: (a) a
proscription against vague and uncertain penal statutes, (b) an
assurance that the charges preferred against an accused shall be
alleged in clear, precise and unambiguous terms, (c) a proscrip-
tion against ex post facto laws, (d) a guarantee that trials
shall be conducted by reasonably competent and impartial tribunals,
(e) compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, (f ) a
prohibition against convictions based on perjured testimony,
one (g). a ban against the imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments. In other specific areas of protection civil lax./ procedures
afford substantially more protection to accused persons than that
afforded by the due process clause. These areas include: (a) a
limited right to trials by jury, (b) limited rights to bail,
(c) rights to appeal to higher tribunals, (d) a proscription
against self-incrimination, and (e) a prohibition against Illegpl
^ >Vouin , Th e Prot e ction of the Accuser1 in_ French Criminal




In a number of other areas of specific safeguards approprfc
to accused persons the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
appears to afford measurably more protection than that afforded
accused, by the civil law.
In the first place, duo process probably prohibits any re-
trial of a person based upon errors of fact unless the trial
court abused its discretion in assessing the facts while arriviii
at its verdict. The civil law, on the other hand, permits the
state to appeal from any decisions of tribunaux s imple po lice o:.
tribunau:: correct ionnels
.
Secondly, accused persons in American state courts are ac-
corded substantial rights with respect to confrontation with
and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, whereas these rights
are extremely limited or virtually non-existant under the civil
law. The process verbal may constitute the prosecution's entire
case before tribunaux simple police and t ribunaux c orre ct ionnels,
At the preparatory examination, from which the process verb aux
originate, witnesses may be examined by the .jug e
_
d' ins truction
out of the presence of the accused. The fact that the accused 1
limited access to the process verbal or the mere likelihood that
the .juge d 1 instruction may be skilled In conducting investiga-
tions or may be disposed to be fair and impartial is hardly a fai
substitute "<°or confrontation with and vigorous cross -examination
of adverse witnesses.
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Again, an accused has an almost unrestricted right to be
present during the entire course of his trial in American state
criminal courts. Those deviations condoned by the due process
clause are of only minor importance. On the other hand, this
right may be largely denied an accused in trials before tribunaux
simple^ 'oplice and tribunaux correctionnels . As noted above, the
,]'
u
ge d * in s true t io n may deny an accused the right to be present
at the preparatory examination while witnesses are being inter-
rogated and these witnesses need not appear in person before tie
above named courts in order for their testimony to be received
into evidence. The accused fares considerably better in this
respect in trials before courts of assize, however, since wit-
nesses must give their testimony in person before that court.
Prompt, speedy and public trials are, ,/ith minor deviations,
guaranteed an accused by the due process clause. No such
assurance is conferred by the criminal procedures of civil lav7
nations. While it is true that trials proper in civil law
nations are substantially as open to the public as in state courts
of the United States, the preparatory examination may be con-
ducted in secret. Exclusion of the public from the preparatory
examination can operate as a genuine hardship to the accused,
especially in those cases where the process verbal constitutes
all or the major part of the prosecution's case. Dilatory
oractices in initiating and conducting trials in uivil law
nations also tend to iiarrass and annoy accused, persons.
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The civil law, in general, makes provision for the assistai
of interpreters only in courts of assize and preparatory ex ami]
bio.ns
, Mo such rights are accorded accused vrho are tried by
t r ibunain : s imp 1 e o o 1 i c e or tribunaux c orre c tionnel s . Due proce;
on the other hand, assures to an accused the assistance of an
interpreter whenever necessary for his defense, at least in
those cases where one is requested,
A fair comparison of those rights to counsel guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment with similar rights afforded an accusec
by bhe civil lax: is somewhat difficult to make. Unquestionably
the civil law affords him considerably more protection in this
respect insofar as trials are concerned. However, as noted
above, unless permitted to do so by the juge d ' ins t rue t ion , an
accused's counsel may not be present at the preparatory examina-
tion when witnesses are being examined. In such, cases his value
to the accused is necessarily limited to giving him such advim
as he can from examining the process verbal , In those cases hI
the -';rocess
i
verbal constitutes the main part of the prosecution 1
case the civil law probably affords less Protection by way of a:
sistance of counsel than is imolic.it in the due process clause,
In other cases the civil law is perhaps equal or somewhat
superior to those minimum standards required by due process.
The rules, pertaining to the burden of proof and presumption
of innocence are substantially the same under the due process
clause and as understood by the civil law. However, the opinion
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of the juge d } ins true tion
,
in matters relating to contraventions
and del its , in those cases where they are investigated by him,
may be decisive as to those issues. The reason therefor, again,
is that the -process verbal, prepared by him, constitutes prima
facie evidence of guilt in those cases tried by tribunaux simpl e
police and tribunaux correctionnels . Any protection afforded
the accused by these rules, therefore, may largely depend upon
the character and wisdom of the jug_e.
Involuntary confessions are totally inadmissible in American
state criminal courts. On the other hand, any duress or coercion
used in obtaining them affect' only their credibility in the
criminal courts of civil law nations. Be that as it may, it may
be doubted that any real differences exist in the practical ap-
plication of the tuo rules since the criminal courts of civil
law nations are largely or exclusively controlled by judges as
opposed to jurors.
Lastly, the practice of keeping an accused in "Preventive
detention may offend due process where such detention is imposec!
for unreasonably long periods of time, under unreasonably severe
conditions or where the facts of the case do not justify its im-
position.
The most serious deficiencies of the civil law nations, as
measured by due process, derive from the extensive use of and
heavy reliance upon the preparatory examination.. A public trial
before a tribunal correct i onne 1 or a right to counsel before that
court can hardly rectify any prejudicial action taken by the juge
-7-}-
d' instruct ion in denying the accused the right to be confronted
with or to cross -examine adverse witnesses at the preparatory
examination. Similarly, such a trial cannot erase the effects
of any abuse of the juge's discretion in assessing the evidence
against the accused or engaging in any other high-handed practit
such as corrupting witnesses-. Careful and critical scrutiny of
the moral character and ability of the jugo is of vital import:
therefore, in determining whether the "Constitutional rights" c,
an -accused have been violated as the result of the operation of
the criminal procedures invoked against him by the authorities
of the civil law nations.
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CHAPTER IV RIGHTS AND SAFEGUARDS CREATED BY THE STATUS OP
FORCES AGREEMENT
Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Status of Forces Agreement
provides that the receiving state 2 shall have exclusive juris-
diction over members of the military forces of the United States,
civilian components thereof and dependents of such members in
respect to those offenses committed by any such person in the
receiving state, which are punishable by the laws of the receiving
state but not punishable by the laws of the United States. That
paragraph further provides that the receiving state shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all such personnel for
all criminal offenses committed by such persons in the receiving
state providod that such offenses are not (a) offenses solely
against- the security or property of the United States, (b) offenses
solely against another member of such United States military force,
civilian component thereof or dependent, or (c) offenses arising
out of any act or omission in the performance of duty.
Paragraph 3 (c) of Article VII of the Agreement provides
that the authorities of the receiving state shall give sympathetic
consideration to any request from United States authorities for
a waiver of its rights in those cases inhere the United States
authorities consider such waiver to be of particular importance.
^Scc Appendix B
2A receiving state is any NATO nation in which United States
troops are stationed.
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This paragraph does not limit such sympathetic consideration tc
those offenses over which the receiving state has the primary
right of jurisdiction. It extends equally to those offenses ovei
which that state has exclusive jurisdiction.
A number of safeguards were incorporated into the treaty wit
the manifest object of increasing protection to United States
military personnel who might be prosecuted by the criminal laws
of the receiving states. Paragraph 9 of Article VII of the
treaty provides that these specific safeguards shall consist of
the following: (a) a prompt and speedy trial, (b) a right to be
informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charges preferred
against an accused United States military person, (c) a right to
be confronted with any witnesses against him, (d) a right to have
compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, if they are
within the jurisdiction of the receiving state, (e) a right to
have counsel of such person's own choice for his defense or to
have, free and assisted counsel under the conditions prevailing
for the time being in the receiving state, (f) if considered
necessary, the right to have the assistance of a competent inter-
preter, and (g) the right to communicate with a representative of
the United States Government and, when 'the rules of the . court ef
the receiving state permit, to have such representative present
at his trial. In addition, paragraph 8 of Article VII of the
treaty provides for limited rights pertaining to double jeopardy,
Deficiencies inherent in a number of specific rights and
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safeguards afforded by tho criminal procedures of the civil law,
as measured by due process, were rectified in full by those
provisions in the Status of Forces Agreement. Others were recti-
fied in part, A few were wholly unaffected by any of these pro-
visions in the treaty. Finally, one provision of the treaty
created a right which is implied neither in the duo process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment nor in the civil law.
Deficiencies in the Civil Law Rectified by SOFA
Those deficiencies in rights and safeguards afforded by the
civil laitf and which were wholly rectified by the Status of
Forces Agreement are as follows: (a) the right to a prompt and
speedy trial as assured by the provisions of paragraph 9 (a) of
Article VII thereof, (b ) tho right to bo confronted with adverse
witnesses, as assured in paragraph 9 (c ) of Article VII thereof,
and (c) the right to the assistance of interpreters, as assured
in paragraph 9(f) of Article VII thereof.
Deficiencies in tho Civil Law Roctifiod in Part by SOFA
Deficiencies in tho civil law relating to doublo jeopardy,
tho right of an accused to be present at his trial and his right




Paragraph 8 of Article VII of the troaty provides, in part,
that when the military authorities of the United States have
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tried an accused by a court martial and such court has acquitted
him or, having convicted him, the accused is serving or has
served his s'ontoncc, the authorities of the receiving state may
not try him again for the same offense, However, nothing in this
paragraph or elsewhere in the treaty prohibits the authorities!
of the receiving state from retrying in their own courts a mombc]
of the United States armod forces who has previously been trice1 :
the i r own court s
.
Paragraph 9(c) of Article VII of the treaty accords tho ac-
cused the right to bo confronted with witnesses against him.
Necessarily implied in this provision, of course, is the right
to be present at his trial during those times when adverse wit-
nesses arc being examined. In addition, this provision should
operate to compel the jugc d 1 instruction to permit the accused
to be present at the preparatory examination when adverse wit-
nesses are being examined in every case where tho process verb a]
is to be used as other than mere cumulative evidence at the ac-
cused's subsequent trial before a tribunal simple -police or
tribunal corrcctionnel . However, nothing in this paragraph or
elsewhere in the treaty accords an accused a right to bo present
at his trial at any times, other than when adverse witnesses eve
being interrogated.
A .
Paragraph 9(e) of Article VII of the treaty makes provision
for the assistance of counsel but expressly excepts such right
when "conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving
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state'' do not porra.it such assistance. This paragraph, standing
alone and apart from provisions in another paragraph of Article
VII, adds nothing, in view of the excepting clause, to those
rights to counsel inherent in the civil law itself. It could
not oblige the ;jugc d ' instruction to permit the accused's coun ,1
to bo present during the interrogation of adverse witnesses at
the preparatory examination. However, when considered in
connection with paragraph 9(c) of Article VII it appears to
assume more significance since the latter paragraph unequivocally
provides that an accused shall have the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. Paragraph 9(c) obligates the
;]ug e d ' ins tru c ti on to permit the accused to be orescnt at the
preparatory examination during his interrogation of adverse wit-
nesses at least if his process verbal is to constitute prima
facie evidence of the accused's guilt at his prospective trial.
The jugc could hardly convincingly assert that the ''prevailing
conditions" would prohibit the presence of the accused's counsel
at the preparatory examination and at the some time admit that
no similar considerations apply to the presence of the accused.
On the other hand, paragraph 9(c) cannot be construed to accord
the accused's counsel the right to bu orcsont at the accused's
trial or the preparatory examination at any other time.
Deficiencies in the Civil Law Unaffected by SOFA
Certain deficiencies inherent in the civil lax/, as measured
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by duo process, wore wholly unaffooted by any provisions of the
Status of Forces Agroomcnt, These deficiencies are: (a) the
right to cross -examine witnesses, (b) the right to a public tria]
under all the circumstances demanded by due process, and (c) the
'right to exclude involuntary confessions as evidence against the
accused.
Right Created by 30PA Not Implied in Duo Process
or the Civil Law
Subparagraph 9(g) of Article ¥11 of the Status of Forces
Agreement extends to an accused a right which is implied neither
in due process nor in the civil law. That provision permits an
accused to communicate with a representative of the Government of
the United States and to have such representative at his trial
when the rules of the court permit. But the court is obligated
by paragraph 9(c) of Article VII to permit the accused to be con-
fronted with adverse witnesses and therefore to be present in
court when they are being examined. Any refusal of the court to
permit the presence of such representative during these times
would appear to be highly arbitrary and inconsistent. Further-
more, the jugc d I ins t r uc t ion would bo hard put to .justify the
exclusion of such representative from the preparatory oxaminati
i
while permitting the accused and his counsel to be so present.
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CHAPTER V AN APPRAISAL OP TEE SENATE INTENT, AS EXPRESSED IN
THE RESOLUTION OF l£ JULY 1953, REGARDING TRIALS
OF UNITED STATES PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN TRIBUNALS
The United States Senate was unwilling to ratify the Status
of Forces Agreement as originally drafted by the Defense Depart-
ment and agreed to in London on 19 June 195>1» By its Resolution
of Ratification it declared, in 'part, as follows: "Where a person
subject to the military jurisdiction of the United States is to
be tried by the authorities of a receiving state, under the treaty
the Commanding Officer of the armed forces of the United States
in such state shall examine the laws of such state with particular
reference to the procedural safeguards contained in the Consti-
tution of the United States (and) if, in the opinion of such com-
manding officer, under all the circumstancos of the case, there
is danger that the accused will not bo protected bo cause of the
absence or denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in th<
United States, the commanding officer shall request the authori-
ties of the receiving state to waive jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 3(c) of Article VII (which
requires the receiving state to give 'sympathetic consideration 1
to such request) -----."
The Senate manifestly considered that those rights and safe-
guards accorded accused persons by the criminal procedures of at
least some of the NATO nations, plus those set forth in paragraphs
Sec Appendix A,
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8 and 9 of Article VII of the Status of Forces Agreement, as
approved in London, fall short of those constitutional rights
which are afforded servicemon by criminal courts in the United
States #
The intent of the Senate in including its reservation in
its Resolution of Ratification of the Status of Forces AgreonoJi
may bo discerned from a consideration of various observations
made by certain Senators on the floor of the Senate when the
treaty was being considered for ratification, During this debet
Senator Wiley declared, "- - - - The committee naturally was
anxious to insure, so far as possible, that American servicemen
who may be tried in foreign courts arc accorded all the cssenti:
rights which they would rocoivo under the Constitution of the
United States, As I have indicated, a number of these rights
arc spelled out in the treaty, itself. Others are provided for;
bho laws of the NATO countries. As an additional stop the
(Foreign Relations) Committee is recommending that the Senate
attach to the resolution of ratification that (hero a statement
of the resolution), Mr. President, it seems to me that this is
as far as the Senate can effectively go. It has been suggested
that we should insist upon exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
our troops abroad. Aside from the merits of exclusive juris-
diction, and it is by no means an unmixed blessing, the
^Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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suggestion is wholly impractical because tho other countries
simply will not agree to it, ,f3 It may be safely concluded, there-
fore, that the Senate intended, by its reservations, to assure
that American serviccnen, who are tried by foreign tribunals,
shall bo accorded at least those rights implicit in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth /xmendmont to the Federal Oonstii-
tution. That the Senate probably intended that the accused should
not necessarily be accorded more than those rights is implicit
in that part of the reservation which directs the State Depart-
ment to protest to the foreign government in the event that any
serviceman shall have been denied the equivalent certain rights
'i
by a foreign tribunal.
There can be little doubt that tho Senate would accept with
extreme reluctance any refusal of a foreign government to permit
the United States military authorities .from exercising the primary
right to jurisdiction in any case where requested and where such
exercise would bo necessary to prevent an injustice to the ac-
cused, as measured by due process standards. During tho debate
in the Senate, when the treaty was being considered for ratifi-
cation, Senator Ferguson declared, !I I would be greatly disappcintc
and would be the first to rise upon this floor to denounce any
nation that refused to waive jurisdiction if thc3?" were not going
,
399 Cong. Roc. 8730.
^Soc discussion of this Dart of the resolution, pp. I|--6, s upr
-
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to accord justice to the American soldier in compliance with
provision number 2 (of the resolution) which I have road. n *
Cognizant authorities of United States military forces
stationed in NATO nations arc well advised, therefore, to
scrutinize with great care all criminal proceedings invoked by
the authorities of a receiving state against any person, military
or civilian, over when they exercise military control, to make c
prompt and resolute protost to appropriate local authorities
whore such action is warranted and, in cases where satisfactory
relief cannot bo effected locally, to fully and promptly report
the facts to tho appropriate Amorican authorities. For such,
it is submitted, is the clear intent of the Senate, as exprcssod
in its reservations incorporated in its ratification of the treat]
^99 Cong. Rcc. 8837j 1 •
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APPENDIX A
OP RATIFICATION, WITH RESERVATIONS,
AS ..GREED TO BY THE SENATE OR JULY 15, 1953
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification
of Executive T, Eighty-second Congress, second session, an agreener
between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of their Forces, signed at London on June 19, 195l«
It is the understanding of the Senate, which understanding
inheres in its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Agreement, that nothing in the Agrocment diminishes, abridges, or
alters the right of the United States of America to safeguard its
own security by excluding or removing persons whose presence in
the United States is deemed prejudicial to its safety or security,
and that no person whose presence in the United States is deemed
prejudicial to its safety or security shall be permitted to enter
or remain in the United States.
In giving its advice and consent to ratification, it is the
sense of the Senate that:
1. The criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII do




Thoro a person subject to the military jurisdiction of
the United States is to be tried by the authorities of a receiving
State, under the treaty the Commanding Officer of the armed forces
of the United States in such state shall examine the laws of such
state with particular reference to the procedural safeguards con-
tained in the Constitution of the United States;
3. If, in the opinion of such commanding officer, under all
the circumstances of the case, there is danger that the accused
will not be protected because of the absence ur denial of con-
stitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States, the com-
manding officer shall request the authorities of the receiving
state to waive jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions cf
paragraph 3(c) of Article VII (which requires the receiving state
to give "sympathetic consideration" to such request) and if such
authorities refuse to waive jurisdiction, the commanding officer
shall request the Department of State to press such request through
diplomatic channels and notification shall be given by the Execu-
tive Branch to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives.
[|. A representative of the United States to be appointed by
the Chief of Diplomatic Uission with the advice of the senior
United States military representative in the receiving state will
8S-
attend tho trial of any such person by the authorities cf a
receiving state under the agreement, and any failure to comply
with tho provisions of paragraph 9 of Article VII of the agrccmen
shall be reported to the commanding officer of the armed forces
of the United States in such state who shall then request the
Department of State to take appropriate action to protect the
rights cf the accused, and notification shall be given by the
^necutive Branch to tho Armed Services Committees of the Sonata
and House of Representatives*
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APPENDIX 3
PERTINENT EXCERPTS PROM THE NATO STATUS OE FORGES
AGREEMENT
ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH I
In this agreement the express ion - -
(a) ''force" moons the personnel belonging to the land, sea
or air armed services nf one Contracting Party when in the
territory of another Contracting Port;/ in the North Atlantic
Treaty area in connexion with their official duties, provided tJ at
the two Contracting Parties concerned nay agree that certain in-
dividuals, units or formations shall not be regarded as consti-




"civilian component" means the civilian personnel ac-
companying a force of a C infracting Party who arc in the employ
of an armed service of that Contracting Party, and who arc not
stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a
Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor or-
dinarily resident in, the State in which the force is located-
(c) "dependent" means the spouse of a member of a force or
of a civilian component, or a child of such member depending on
him or her for support;
(d) ''sending State" means the Contracting Party to which the
force belongs;
(o) ;!rcc jiving State" moans the Contracting Party in the
territory of which the force or civilian component is located,
whether it be stationed there or passing in transit-
(f) "military authorities of the sending State" means those
authorities of a sending State who are empowered by its law to en-
force the military law of that State with rcseect to members of
its forces or civilian components;
(g) "North Atlantic Council" moans the Council established
by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty or any of its subsidiary
bodies authorised to act on its behalf,
ARTICLE VII, PARAGRAPH I
Sub j e c t to th o provi s 1ons of thi s Art ic 1 o
,
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall hove
tho right to exorcise within the receiving State all criminal are
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred ^n thorn by tho law of the
sending State over all porsons subject to the military law of tl: t
State
;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have juris-
diction over the members of a force or civilian component and their
dependents with respect to offences committed within tho territory
of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State,
.8?.
ARTICLE VII, PARAGRAPH 2
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall hay
the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject
to the military law of that State with respect to offences, in-
cluding offences relating to its security, punishable by the lain
of the sending State, but not by the law 3.f the receiving State,
(b
)
The authorities of the receiving State shall have the
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a fore.:
02' civilian component and their dependents with respect to offcr.o
including offences relating to the security of that State, puni;.'.
able by its law but not by the law of the sending State.
(c) Per the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3
of this article a security offence against a State shall include
(i) treason "gainst the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relatini
to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the
national defence of that State.
ARTICLE VII, PARAGRAPH 3
In cases whore the right to e?;erclsc jurisdiction is concurrent
the following rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of
a force or of a civilian component in relation to
(i) offences solely against thu property or security
of that State, or offences solely against the person or proper!
of another member of the force or civilian component of that
Stato or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or emission done
in the performance of official duty.
(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of t'u
receiving Stato shall have the primary right to exorcise juris-
diction.
(c) If the Stato having bho primary right decides net to
exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the
other State as soon .as practicable. The authorities of the Stato
having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to
a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver
c f its right in cases whero that other Stato considers such waiv r
to bo of particular importance,
ARTICLE VII, PARAGRAPH 8
Where an accused has- been tried in accordance with the pro
visions of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting
Party and has been -acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving
or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not bo
tried again for the same offence with, the same territory by the
authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in
this paragraph shall prevent the military .authorities of the
sending State from trying a member of its forco for any viclati on
-88-
of rules of discipline arising from act cr omission which con-
stituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities
of another Contracting Party.
ARTICLE VII,' PARAGRAPH 9
.Jhcncvcr a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent
is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he
shall bo entitled —
(a) to a prompt' and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific
charge or charges made against him;
(c) to bo confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory pre cess for obtaining witnesses in
his favour, if they are within the jurisdiction ;:f the receiving
State;
(c ) to have legal representation of his own choice for his
defence or to have froo cr assisted legal representation under




if ho considers it necessary > to have the services of
a competent interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a- representative of the Govern-
ment of the sending State and, when the rules of the court permit,
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